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Actions by both private sector organizations and legislators in recent years have
highlighted the importance of the audit committee of the board of directors of
corporations in the financial reporting process. For example, the Sarbanes Oxley Act
of 2002 has multiple sections that deal with the composition and functioning of audit
committees. My dissertation examines multiple issues related to the composition of
audit committees.
In the first two parts of my dissertation, I examine the stock market reactions to
disclosures of audit committee appointments and departures in the 8-Ks filed with the
SEC during 2008 and 2009. I find that there is a positive stock market reaction to the
appointment of audit committee directors who are financial experts. The second essay
investigates the cumulative abnormal return to departure of audit committee directors. I
find that when an accounting expert leaves the audit committee, the market reaction is
significantly negative. These results are consistent with regulators’ concerns related to
having directors with audit, accounting and other financial expertise on corporate audit
committees.
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The third essay of my dissertation examines the changes in audit committee
composition in the last decade. I find that while the increase in audit committee size is
relatively modest, there has been a significant increase in the number of audit
committee experts and the frequency of audit committee meetings over the past decade;
interestingly, such increase in the number of meetings has persisted even after the
media focus on the auditing profession, in the immediate aftermath of the Enron and
Andersen failures, have waned. My results show that audit committee composition and
its role continues to evolve with regulatory and other corporate governance related
changes.
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I: INTRODUCTION
In the modern corporation, owners (i.e., shareholders) and managers are
distinct. Agency theory suggests that there is a difference in the interests of managers
and owners [Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983)]. Hence, there is a need for
monitoring the financial statements issued by management.
The board of directors provides the primary monitoring role in the context of
public companies. However, consistent with the trend towards specialization, boards
of directors have formed sub-committees of the board that deal with diverse functions.
The audit committee is a sub-committee of the board of directors. The principal
function of the audit committee is to oversee management and external auditors in the
financial reporting process. The committee thus serves to protect the interest of the
shareholders by providing an oversight over management’s presentation of the
financial statements.
The role of audit committees has been discussed since the early 1940s by
regulators and others interested in strong corporate governance. The Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC) and other auditing/corporate governance proponents
have had a continued interest in the formation and effective functioning of audit
committees, and many regulatory changes have shaped the changes related to audit
committees over the years.
In 2002, after the demise of Enron and Worldcom, and the failure of Andersen,
Congress enacted the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX 2002). SOX further emphasized the
role of audit committee directors. Although SOX has had a very significant impact on
the role and functioning of audit committees, there were several legislative and
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regulatory reports prior to SOX, such as the Treadway Commission (1987) and the
Blue Ribbon Panel (1999), which emphasized on the composition, independence and
expertise of audit committee members. Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), in his speech at New York University (Levitt
1998), emphasized that the financial reporting process was facing turbulent times and
that there had been gradual erosion in the quality of financial reporting. He pointed out
that audit committees need to improve their oversight function and called for
“strengthening of the audit committee process” (Levitt 1998, 12). In response to
Levitt’s speech which called for a more vigilant audit committee, the Blue Ribbon
panel, convened by the SEC, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National
Association of Security Dealers (NASD) released recommendations on improving the
role of audit committee members in the financial reporting process.
One of the key recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Panel (1999) was to
recruit audit committee members who are fully independent of the company. Another
recommendation was that all NYSE and NASD firms with a market capitalization of
more than $200 million must have - a fully independent audit committee, an audit
committee size of at least three directors: each of whom is a financial literate and that
at least one member must possess accounting or financial management expertise.
Other recommendations made by the Blue Ribbon Panel suggested that each audit
committee member of a listed company must adopt a formal charter that is approved
by the board of directors and which specifies the scope of the member’s
responsibilities, and that each audit committee disclose in the company’s proxy
statement whether it has adopted a formal written charter and if it has satisfied its
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responsibilities during the year in compliance with the charter. The panel also
recommended increased communication of audit committees with internal auditors
and external auditors.
More recently, SOX (2002) has formalized the role of audit committees in the
financial reporting process. Multiple sections of SOX deal with the composition and
functioning of audit committees. Section 301 of SOX mandates all publicly-listed
companies to have fully independent members preside on the audit committees. An
independent audit committee will serve as effective monitors of management; this in
turn will improve the quality of financial reporting. Section 407 of SOX requires a
company to disclose whether its audit committee includes at least one member who is
designated as the audit committee financial expert. A company that does not have a
designated financial expert on its audit committee must explain why it does not have
such an expert.
Regulators and standard-setters have demanded increased communication
between audit committee directors and external auditors. The standard-setters have
also encouraged for a more two-way communication between audit committees and
external auditors. SEC (2000) states in its final rules that companies disclose in their
proxy statements whether their audit committee is governed by a charter, and if so,
include a copy of the charter as an appendix to the proxy statement at least one every
three years. This new requirement was promulgated to provide information to the
shareholders which they can use to assess the role and responsibilities of the audit
committee. The SEC also encouraged companies to personalize their charters and stay
away from using a “boiler plate” template. The SEC’s purpose in mandating the
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publication of the audit committee charter and audit committee report was to promote
transparency of the role and actual functioning of the audit committee which in turn
would allow the investors to assess the efforts of the audit committee.
Carcello et al. (2002) conduct study to examine a random sample of 150 proxy
statements filed in Spring 2001. They find that there is a disparity in what audit
committees state they are doing and what is stated in their charters; such variations are
associated with firm size, exchange listing, and the composition of audit committees.
Prior research has examined some issues related to the presence of financial
experts on audit committees. Subsequent to the implementation of SOX Section 407,
Williams (2005) investigates characteristics of financial experts. She finds that most
companies were able to identify a financial expert and that several companies had
more than one financial expert on their audit committees.
Davidson et al. (2004) and DeFond et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence to
show that companies that hire audit committee directors with financial expertise are
rewarded by the market. DeFond et al. (2005) study a sample of 702 newly appointed
outside directors to audit committees from 1993 to 2002. They find a positive market
reaction when accounting financial experts are appointed to the audit committee.
Davidson et al. (2004) use a relatively smaller sample because they limited their
sample selection to those firms that had press releases and public announcements.
Both of the above mentioned studies use data from the pre-SOX period. More
importantly, both studies examine market reaction to the appointment of different
types of audit committee directors.
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In my dissertation, I examine the market reaction to audit committee
appointments and departures in the post SOX period. I study the cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) using a 3-day and a 5-day window to examine market reaction to news
of appointments and departures.
In the first part of my dissertation, I explore the market reaction to audit
committee director appointments. Under Section 407 of SOX, each firm is required to
disclose in its proxy statement the name of the audit committee financial expert.
Throughout my dissertation, I refer to such an expert as a company designated audit
committee financial expert. Using a sample of 360 audit committee director
appointments (single-director appointments) during 2008, I find that the overall
market reaction to the appointments of audit committee directors is not significant. I
focus on single-director appointments because I want to control for other confounding
factors that could be associated with multiple appointments.
I find interesting results after partitioning the sample by audit committee
directors’ expertise. I divide audit committee directors into three groups of experts –
the first is an Audit/CPA expert who is either a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or
has been an audit manager or partner with an auditing firm; the second is an
Accounting/Finance expert who has prior experience as a CFO, Treasurer, Vice
President – Finance, etc.; the last category of Other expert comprises of all directors
classified audit committee financial experts by the company. I find that when an
Audit/CPA expert is hired to serve on the audit committee the market reacts positively
(significant at 10%) even when the director is not a designated audit committee
financial expert. In a sub-sample of 30 events, I find that firms that have four or more
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audit committee financial experts present on the audit committee after the new
appointment had a positive market reaction of 3% (significant at 1%). This result
shows that presence of a team of audit committee financial experts is viewed
positively by the market.
The second part of my dissertation investigates the market reaction to audit
committee director departures. I have a total of 881 events of director departures.
However, I am able to obtain the market reaction for only 300 events because most of
the firms in my sample are relatively small. My final sample, after eliminating
observations with other contemporaneous events, consists of 229 instances of audit
committee director departures. I find that the departure of an accounting expert is
perceived negatively by the market; the average market reaction for such events is 3.1% (significant at 5%). These results provide support to the notion that accounting
experts are valued on audit committees and the news of their exit can adversely impact
the market value of a firm.
The second part of my dissertation also addresses an ongoing debate regarding
audit committee director tenure. The proponents for long tenure state that an audit
committee director who has served a long period is more knowledgeable and hence a
valued member of the board. On the other hand, some members of the business
community believe that is a need for a “fresh set of eyes” and that periodic rotation of
audit committee members is required. I partition my sample based on director tenure
and find that there is a significant negative reaction when a short tenure (0-3 years)
and medium tenure director departs from the audit committee. Further, I run several
analyses on sub-samples of my data based on ‘busyness’ of a director (measured by
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the number of other boards a director serves on), strength of audit committee
(measured by the number of audit committee financial experts post departures), age of
directors and whether the director was appointed to the audit committee from within
the board or (s)he was appointed from outside.
In the aftermath of Enron, as Congress was debating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
there were many concerns about the lack of individuals with the necessary expertise to
serve as audit committee members. Many critics noted that it will be difficult to find
people to serve as audit committee members (Dunham 2002). Multiple stories in the
media noted that directors who possessed financial expertise such as those who had
served as CFOs were even more difficult to recruit because of increased
responsibilities (Lavelle 2002, Maher 2002). The vice chairman of an executive
recruiting firm estimated that many director candidates were likely to turn down
invitations to serve on boards due to litigation risks (Dunham 2002). Glater and
Treaster (2002) note that the big insurance companies had significantly reduced
director coverage and had even asked some members to share the expense of
settlements. Such actions further drove directors away from accepting directorships
that could possibly adversely affect their personal pockets. Hennessey and Whitman
(2002) cite that increased workload discouraged directors from serving on boards; the
burden of additional meetings and decrease in insurance coverage were one of the two
most dominant factors driving directors away.
Thus, many critics suggested during the immediate aftermath of the Enron and
Andersen failures that the changed corporate governance environment allegedly made
it difficult to recruit competent individuals to serve as board members and audit
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committee members. This provides the motivation for the third part of my
dissertation, where I analyze the metamorphosis of audit committees nearly a decade
after the Enron. I provide an overview of the incoming and outgoing directors. I find
that directors with Audit/CPA and Accounting/Finance experience are highly sought
after and most firms continue to add more and more audit committee financial experts
to their audit committees. I also find that there was a sharp increase in the number of
meetings in the immediate aftermath of Enron; interestingly, this has not reversed as
we move further away from the tumultuous period of the Enron and Andersen failures.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II discusses
the background and related research on audit committees, followed by Chapter III
which examines market reaction to audit committee director appointments. Chapter IV
investigates the market reaction to audit committee director departures. Chapter V
discusses changes in the composition and diligence of audit committees over the past
and Chapter VI provides a summary and conclusion.
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II: BACKGROUND AND RELATED RESEARCH
The role of audit committees in ensuring high quality financial reporting has
long been recognized by regulators. For example, the SEC (1999b) noted:
“Audit committees play a critical role in the financial reporting system by
overseeing and monitoring management's and the independent auditors'
participation in the financial reporting process. An audit committee can
facilitate communications between a company's board of directors, its
management, and its internal and independent auditors. A properly functioning
audit committee helps to enhance the reliability and credibility of financial
disclosures. ...
Audit committees oversee and monitor management and the independent
auditors in the financial reporting process, and thereby play a critical role in
assuring the credibility of financial reporting. Audit committees can facilitate
communications between a company's board of directors, its management, and
its internal and independent auditors on significant accounting issues and
policies. They can provide a forum separate from management in which
auditors can candidly discuss any concerns. By effectively carrying out their
many functions and responsibilities, audit committees help to enhance the
reliability and credibility of financial reports.”
The Commission noted that it had a long tradition of encouraging the formation of
effective audit committees. In the same rule proposal cited above, the SEC noted:
“Since the early 1940s, the Commission, along with the auditing and corporate
communities, has had a continuing interest in promoting effective and
independent audit committees. It was, in large measure, with the Commission's
encouragement, for instance, that the self-regulatory organizations first
adopted audit committee requirements in the 1970s. In 1974 and 1978, the
Commission adopted rules requiring certain disclosures about audit
committees. In 1980, the Commission issued a staff report on corporate
accountability that addresses some of the issues underlying today's proposals.
Former SEC Commissioner James Treadway led the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting that issued recommendations on corporate
audit committees in 1987.”
In 1987, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting
(NCFFR) recommended to the SEC that it mandate all public companies to form audit
committees comprised exclusively of independent members. It is important to note
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that, despite the SEC’s periodic exhortations to have effective audit committees,
independent and effective audit committees were quite uncommon until late 1970s.
Pincus et al. (1989) study the voluntary formation of audit committees by
NASDAQ listed firms, and find that firms with lower managerial ownership were
more likely to have an audit committee. These results support the notion that the
higher the agency costs of equity, the more incentive a company has to form an audit
committee. Pincus et al. (1989) also find that NASDAQ firms that voluntarily formed
audit committees were firms that were large, had higher proportion of outside directors
and had a big eight auditor.
In a similar vein, Bradbury (1990) relies on agency theory to analyze the
voluntary formation of audit committees. However his findings are different from
those of Pincus et al. (1989). He uses a sample of 135 firms listed on the New Zealand
Stock Exchange and finds that that voluntary formation of audit committees is neither
related to auditor variables nor to agency cost variables. Instead, he finds a
relationship between directors’ incentives and voluntary formation of audit
committees. He cites several reasons to support his findings one of which is that the
demand for audit committees in New Zealand may be lower due to the presence of a
low-litigation environment.
McMullen (1996) conducts a study to investigate if the presence of an audit
committee has an impact on the financial reporting quality of a company. Her sample
is divided into five treatment groups. The first group consists of companies with
shareholder litigation due to fraud and errors in the financial statements. Her sample
is for the years 1984-1988 and she has 96 firms in the first treatment group. In the
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second group, she has 69 firms that restated quarterly earnings for the years 19821988. In the third group, she refers to Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
errors to identify 62 firms that violated SEC regulations during 1982-1988. The fourth
group comprises of 82 firms that committed illegal acts during 1984-1988 and finally
the fifth group consists of 67 companies that switched auditors when there was a
disagreement between management and the predecessor auditor during 1984-1988.
She measures (the lack of) high quality financial reporting by the incidence of errors,
irregularities and illegal acts; she uses shareholder litigation alleging fraudulent
financial reporting, corrections of reported quarterly earnings, SEC enforcement
action, illegal acts and auditor turnover involving a client-auditor disagreement as
proxies to measure financial reporting quality. McMullen (1996) finds that the
presence of an audit committee is associated with reduced likelihood of shareholder
lawsuits, restatements, enforcement actions and auditor turnover following
disagreement between auditor and client.
In 1998, the then SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt, gave a well-publicized talk
titled “The Numbers Game” in which he discussed the role of audit committees in
ensuring financial reporting quality. Spurred by this speech, two private sector
organizations set up task forces which then issued their reports about the formation of
effective audit committees among public companies. The Report of the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC
1999) and the National Association of Corporate Directors’ Report of the NACD Blue
Ribbon Commission on Director Professionalism (NACD 2000) presented various
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recommendations to improve audit committee effectiveness in response to the
changing business environment.
During the period from 1999 to 2003, the SEC acted on multiple occasions to
strengthen the composition and functioning of audit committees. The Commission
proposed, and later adopted a rule, “to improve disclosure relating to the functioning
of corporate audit committees.” The SEC’s (1999b) new rules require that:
•

•

•

•

companies include reports of their audit committees in their proxy
statements; in the report, the audit committee must state whether the
audit committee has: (i) reviewed and discussed the audited financial
statements with management; (ii) discussed with the independent
auditors the matters required to be discussed by Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 61, as may be modified or supplemented; and (iii)
received from the auditors disclosures regarding the auditors'
independence required by Independence Standards Board Standard No.
1, as may be modified or supplemented, and discussed with the auditors
the auditors' independence (see Section III.B below);
the report of the audit committee also include a statement by the audit
committee whether, based on the review and discussions noted above,
the audit committee recommended to the Board of Directors that the
audited financial statements be included in the company's Annual
Report on Form 10-K or 10-KSB (as applicable) for the last fiscal year
for filing with the Commission (see Section III.B below);
companies disclose in their proxy statements whether their Board of
Directors has adopted a written charter for the audit committee, and if
so, include a copy of the charter as an appendix to the company's proxy
statements at least once every three years (see Section III.C below);
companies, including small business issuers, whose securities are
quoted on Nasdaq or listed on the American Stock Exchange
("AMEX") or New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), disclose in their
proxy statements whether the audit committee members are
“independent” as defined in the applicable listing standards, and
disclose certain information regarding any director on the audit
committee who is not “independent”; require that companies, including
small business issuers, whose securities are not quoted on Nasdaq or
listed on the AMEX or NYSE disclose in their proxy statements
whether, if they have an audit committee, the members are
“independent,” as defined in the NASD's, AMEX's or NYSE's listing
standards, and which definition was used.
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Later, in November 2000, the SEC issued a comprehensive rule on auditor
independence. While the rule was primarily related to the supply of non-audit services
by auditors to their SEC registrant clients, one part of the rule also dealt with
disclosures by audit committees. Specifically, the SEC (2000) noted that:
“We have modified the proposed disclosure to require disclosure only of
whether the audit committee considered whether the principal accountant's
provision of the information technology services and other non-audit services
to the registrant is compatible with maintaining the principal accountant's
independence. ... we believe that companies will be providing useful
information to investors under the modified requirement. Investors will be
aided by knowing whether the company's audit committee considered whether
the provision of non-audit services by the company's principal accountant is
compatible with maintaining the accountant's independence. We are requiring
issuers to disclose only whether the audit committee considered whether the
principal accountant's provision of non-audit services is compatible with
maintaining the principal accountant's independence.”
The regulators, standard-setters, academics and the business community
continued to lobby for more effective audit committees emphasizing the
independence, expertise and responsibilities of audit committee members. The fall of
Arthur Anderson and Enron provided further impetus to legislators and regulators to
further strengthen the role of audit committees in the financial reporting process. This
culminated in the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002; SOX has multiple sections that deal
with the composition and functioning of audit committees, as discussed in more detail
below.
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Independence of Audit Committees

Since 1978, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has required listed
companies to have audit committees comprised of wholly independent directors.
NYSE rules prohibited officers, employees and affiliates of the company from serving
as audit committee members. However, the corporation’s board of directors have the
authority to appoint audit committee members and may appoint “grey” directors.
Vicknair et al. (1993, 53) note that “These ‘grey’ directors include relatives of
management, consultants, interlocking directors retired executives of the firm”. Such a
process diminishes the independence requirement and hence may reduce the
effectiveness of audit committee members. Vicknair et al. (1993) find the presence of
“grey” directors to be quite common in their sample; 74 percent of the audit
committees in their sample had at least one “grey” director and, somewhat
surprisingly, “grey” directors constituted a majority in 26 percent of their sample.
As noted above, the SEC issued rules in 1999 that required registrants to
indicate if any member of the audit committee was not independent. However, the
definitions of independence were dependent on the listing rules of the NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ. As noted in Raghunandan and Rama (2007), there was substantial
variation among the listing requirements; in addition, there were many instances when
firms stated that their members were independent, yet disclosed transactions between
the firm and the audit committee director(s) under the “Certain Relationships” section
of the proxy statement. Further, it is important to note that the SEC’s 1999 rules did
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not mandate that the audit committee directors be independent; the rules only required
disclosure about the (lack of ) independence of audit committee directors.
Section 301 of SOX (2002) is titled “Public Company Audit Committees” and
states as follows:
``(m) Standards Relating to Audit Committees.-``(1) Commission rules.-``(A) In general.--Effective <<NOTE: Deadline.>> not
later than 270 days after the date of enactment of this
subsection, the Commission shall, by rule, direct the
national securities exchanges and national securities
associations to prohibit the listing of any security of
an issuer that is not in compliance with the
requirements of any portion of paragraphs (2) through
(6).
``(B) Opportunity to cure defects.--The rules of the
Commission under subparagraph (A) shall provide for
appropriate procedures for an issuer to have an
opportunity to cure any defects that would be the basis
for a prohibition under subparagraph (A), before the
imposition of such prohibition.
``(2) Responsibilities relating to registered public
accounting firms.--The audit committee of each issuer, in its
capacity as a committee of the board of directors, shall be
directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and
oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm
employed by that issuer (including resolution of disagreements
between management and the auditor regarding financial
reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit
report or related work, and each such registered public
accounting firm shall report directly to the audit committee.
``(3) Independence.-``(A) In general.--Each member of the audit
committee of the issuer shall be a member of the board
of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be
independent.
``(B) Criteria.--In order to be considered to be
independent for purposes of this paragraph, a member of
an audit committee of an issuer may not, other than in
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his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee,
the board of directors, or any other board committee-``(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or
other compensatory fee from the issuer; or
``(ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer
or any subsidiary thereof.
``(C) Exemption authority.--The Commission may
exempt from the requirements of subparagraph (B) a
particular relationship with respect to audit committee
members, as the Commission determines appropriate in
light of the circumstances.
Pursuant to Section 301 of SOX, the SEC issued a proposal and then the final rules
relating to audit committee director independence in 2003. The final SEC (2003) rules
state as follows:
(i) The rules of each national securities exchange or national securities
association meeting the requirements of this section must be operative, and
listed issuers must be in compliance with those rules, by the following dates:
(A) July 31, 2005 for foreign private issuers and small business issuers (as
defined in § 240.12b-2); and
(B) For all other listed issuers, the earlier of the listed issuer's first annual
shareholders meeting after January 15, 2004, or October 31, 2004.
(ii) Each national securities exchange and national securities association must
provide to the Commission, no later than July 15, 2003, proposed rules or rule
amendments that comply with this section.
(iii) Each national securities exchange and national securities association must
have final rules or rule amendments that comply with this section approved by
the Commission no later than December 1, 2003.
(b) Required standards.
(1) Independence.
(i) Each member of the audit committee must be a member of the board of
directors of the listed issuer, and must otherwise be independent; provided that,
where a listed issuer is one of two dual holding companies, those companies
may designate one audit committee for both companies so long as each
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member of the audit committee is a member of the board of directors of at least
one of such dual holding companies.
(ii) Independence requirements for non-investment company issuers. In order
to be considered to be independent for purposes of this paragraph (b)(1), a
member of an audit committee of a listed issuer that is not an investment
company may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit
committee, the board of directors, or any other board committee:
(A) Accept directly or indirectly any consulting, advisory, or other
compensatory fee from the issuer or any subsidiary thereof, provided that,
unless the rules of the national securities exchange or national securities
association provide otherwise, compensatory fees do not include the receipt of
fixed amounts of compensation under a retirement plan (including deferred
compensation) for prior service with the listed issuer (provided that such
compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service); or
(B) Be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.
In summary, the independence requirement for public companies has slowly evolved
over time, starting from the 1940s. In the post-SOX period, subject to certain
exceptions (such as, those for registrants following an initial public offering), public
company audit committee directors are expected to be independent. However, the
caveat is that the detailed independence rules themselves are based on exchange listing
requirements, and these requirements vary across stock exchanges.
Expertise of Audit Committees

The SEC and private sector organizations have also stressed the importance of
financial literacy and expertise for audit committee members. The Blue Ribbon
Committee (1999) noted the need for presence of financial literates on the audit
committee. According to the report “literacy signified the ability to read and
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understand fundamental financial statements, including a company’s balance sheet,
income statement and cash flow statement”.
Unlike with independence, the SEC refrained from any rules related to
mandating the presence or disclosure of financial literacy or expertise for audit
committee directors. This situation changed with the enactment of SOX. Section 407
of SOX is titled “Disclosure of Audit Committee Financial Expert” and reads as
follows:
(a) Rules Defining ``Financial Expert''.--The Commission shall issue
rules, as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent
with the protection of investors, to require each issuer, together with
periodic reports required pursuant to sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to disclose whether or not, and if not,
the reasons therefor, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of
at least 1 member who is a financial expert, as such term is defined by
the Commission.
(b) Considerations.--In defining the term ``financial expert'' for
purposes of subsection (a), the Commission shall consider whether a
person has, through education and experience as a public accountant or
auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or principal
accounting officer of an issuer, or from a position involving the
performance of similar functions-(1) an understanding of generally accepted accounting
principles and financial statements;
(2) experience in-(A) the preparation or auditing of financial
statements of generally comparable issuers; and
(B) the application of such principles in connection
with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and
reserves;
(3) experience with internal accounting controls; and
(4) an understanding of audit committee functions.
(c) Deadline for Rulemaking.--The Commission shall-(1) propose rules to implement this section, not later than
90 days after the date of enactment of this Act; and
(2) issue final rules to implement this section, not later
than 180 days after that date of enactment.
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Pursuant to the requirements of Section 407, in October 2002, the SEC
proposed rules related to the disclosure of audit committee financial experts. The
initial proposal defined the term “financial expert” as follows: (SEC 2002a)
“a person who has, through education and experience as a public accountant,
auditor, principal financial officer, controller or principal accounting officer, of
a company that, at the time the person held such position, was required to file
reports pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, or experience
in one or more positions that involve the performance of similar functions (or
that results, in the judgment of the company's board of directors, in the person's
having similar expertise and experience),the following attributes:
An understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and
financial statements;
(2)
Experience applying such generally accepted accounting principles
in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves that are
generally comparable to the estimates, accruals and reserves, if any, used in the
registrant's financial statements;
(3)
Experience preparing or auditing financial statements that present
accounting issues that are generally comparable to those raised by the
registrant's financial statements;
(4)
Experience with internal controls and procedures for financial
reporting; and
An understanding of audit committee functions.”
(1)

The above definition of “audit committee financial expert” received huge
backlash from the corporate community. Many commenters viewed the definition to
be too restrictive. The SEC (2003b) noted that “Several expressed concern that many
companies, especially small ones, would have a difficult time attracting an audit
committee member who would quality as an expert under the proposed definition.”
Many critics also expressed concerns that companies may have to let go their current
directors who do not fit the SEC definition of an audit committee financial expert.
There were many comments emphasizing that the role of audit committee members
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was one of oversight rather than “direct involvement in the company’s accounting
functions.”
It was not surprising that the business community reacted strongly to the
proposed definition of who is an audit committee financial expert. Under the proposed
definition, financial luminaries such as Warren Buffet and Alan Greenspan also did
not adequately fit the definition of an audit committee expert, since none of them were
actively engaged in preparation of financial statements. (AABD 2002, Bryan-Low
2002). In a letter to the SEC, the Executive Vice President, General Counsel and
Secretary of AmSouth Bancorporation expressed concerns stating that the proposed
definition “unnecessarily limits the universe of persons who might be effective
members of an audit committee” (AmSouth Bancorporation 2002).
Based on the response of numerous comments from the business community,
the SEC revised the definition of an audit committee financial expert. The final rules
(SEC 2003a) define an audit committee financial expert as a person who understands
GAAP; has an ability to assess the application of GAAP in association with estimates,
accruals and reserves; has experience in the preparation, audit, analysis and evaluation
of financial statements or has experience in active supervision of such a person; has an
understanding of internal controls and an understanding of the audit committee
functions. The SEC implementation of the rule for Section 407 is for fiscal years
ending on or after July 15, 2003.1

1

Small business issuers were required to comply with the audit committee financial expert disclosure
requirements in their annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after December 15, 2003.
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The SEC defines an Audit Committee financial expert (ACFE) as an individual
who has an understanding of financial statements and generally accepted accounting
principles. An audit committee financial expert must also possess a thorough
understanding of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting and must
understand the functions of the audit committee. The SEC rules indicate that the above
mentioned attributes of an audit committee financial expert may be acquired through
education and experience of having served as a controller, chief-financial officer,
principal accounting office, auditor or having supervised a principal financial officer
or through other relevant experience (SEC 2003a). Importantly, if a company discloses
that it does not have an audit committee financial expert, it must also explain why it
does not have such an expert. The SEC Chair, William H. Donaldson noted the
importance of disclosures to the investing community in a testimony before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. (Donaldson 2003). He stated that
“These disclosures will improve transparency to investors in evaluating the experience
of the audit committees of companies in which they invest.”
As mentioned earlier, the SEC revised the definition of an audit committee
financial expert several times prior to reaching the final version. Many critics had
suggested that there will be a shortage of such experts in the market making it difficult
for corporate boards to fill their seats.
Williams (2005) investigates the audit committee financial expert disclosure
requirement under Section 407 of SOX (2002). She finds that there is no shortage of
experts who qualify as audit committee financial experts and in fact some firms in her
sample had more than one designated audit committee financial expert. She also finds
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that there is no increased liability for directors who are identified as financial experts
indicating that safe harbor provisions may have mitigated such worries. Specifically,
based on proxy information for 489 firms (370 S&P 500 firms, with the remaining
being small firms) for the first annual meeting following the effective date of the
required disclosure - she finds that 98 percent of S&P 500 firms in her sample disclose
the name of at least one audit committee financial expert compared to 96 percent for
small firms. She also finds that 46 percent of the sample discloses the presence of two
or more financial experts. Her results are interesting because there was a significant
amount of resistance from the business community as evidenced in the SEC comment
letters citing the dearth of expert directors.
While the SEC has required disclosures about audit committees, the level of
disclosures varied among companies. On one hand, some firms provided detailed
explanations with regard to their financial experts but on the other hand others were
more concise in their explanations. Carcello et al. (2006) examine a sample of 400
companies with fiscal year-ends between July 15, 2003 and December 31, 2003. They
examine the proxy statements to view disclosures (location of disclosure, level of
detail, number of experts named) related to audit committee financial experts. They
find that 98 percent of the companies in their sample made the required financial
expert disclosure and almost 30 percent of their sample companies had an increase in
the number of experts since the passage of SOX. They also examine the details of the
disclosures made by each company. Using a logistic regression model, they find that
company size is positively associated with designation of an audit committee financial
expert. They also find that companies that operate in a high litigious environment and
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those companies where the audit committees met at least 4 times a year were more
likely to make disclosures of financial experts.
In order to provide more detail on which firms were more likely to hire more
than one financial expert, Krishnan and Lee (2009) study the determinants of firms’
choices of accounting and non accounting financial experts. They study a sample of
802 firms (3,218 audit committee directors) and their financial data relates to the fiscal
year ended after July 15, 2003 because their primary focus is on the presence of audit
committee financial expertise after the effective date of Section 407 of SOX. They
find that 59 percent of their sample firms has one or more accounting financial experts
on their audit committee and that firms that operate in a high-litigation environment
were more likely to have accounting financial experts on their audit committees
provided they had a strong corporate governance model.
In summary, the presence of experts (in some cases two or more) and the level
of such disclosures in the company’s proxy statements signaled the presence of a good
governance model to the investing community.
In the next sub-section, I examine the consequences of having independent
audit committee members and financial experts on the audit committee. Given below
is an overview of academic literature that has examined the association between audit
committee composition and (a) audit committee interaction with external auditors, (b)
audit committee interaction with internal auditors, and (c) quality of financial
reporting.
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Consequences of Audit Committee Composition
Audit Committee Composition and Interaction with External Auditors
The role of audit committee members is one of overseeing a company’s
financial statements and financial reporting quality. To fulfill these responsibilities,
audit committees must maintain effective communication with external auditors.
Some studies have examined the association between audit committee characteristics
and their interaction with external auditors.
Carcello et al. (2002) note that audit committees bear the responsibility of
recruiting an external audit firm to deliver a high quality audit. Since audit committee
members face increased exposure in terms of reputational capital and legal liability,
they are further inclined to protect shareholder interests. These interests can be
protected by facilitating a high quality audit which would lead to higher audit fees
being paid to the external auditors. Carcello et al. (2002) send a questionnaire to
controllers for all Fortune 1000 companies and request them to provide the external
audit fees for the period April 1992 and March 1993. They find a significant positive
relationship between audit fees and board independence, diligence and expertise. They
also find that audit committee variables such as audit committee independence and
expertise also have a positive relationship with audit fees.
Abbott et al. (2003) examine audit committee characteristics such as
independence, financial expertise and number of meetings in association with audit
fees. They find that audit fees are higher for firms that had fully independent audit
committees. Their results indicate audit committees that have only independent
members and have members with financial expertise are more likely to demand
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increased scope of auditing services from their external auditors, hence driving the
audit fees upwards. The results support the notion that members with financial
expertise and 100 percent independence act as good governance tools, as intended by
the BRC and ISB in their recommendations (BRC 1999, ISB 1999).
DeZoort et al. (2003) conduct an experiment using audit committee members’
judgment and attitudes in instances of auditor-management disputes. More
specifically, they study if auditor’s materiality justification and the precision of the
accounting issue impacts audit committee members’ level of support for the external
auditor in case of an auditor-management dispute. They find that audit committee
members provide more support for the external auditor when the auditor’s materiality
decisions are deduced using both quantitative and consequences-oriented factors. They
also find that audit committee members supported the auditor when the accounting
issue demanded precise measurement. Additionally, they find that audit committee
members with CPA experience are more likely to support external auditors in such
disputes with management.
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) uses a sample of 401 firms to examine
whether the presence of an audit committee, as well as specific audit committee
characteristics, are associated with higher audit fees. She collects information on
internal audit activities by sending a questionnaire to all companies listed on the
Australian Stock Exchange in October 2000 (approximately 1,400 companies). She
finds that audit committee expertise is associated with higher audit fees when
independence and meeting frequency is low.

25

Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) collect data audit committee and board
characteristics during fiscal 2004 for a sample of 2,393 firms. They find that a strong
audit committee often demands a higher level of assurance and is less likely to dismiss
its auditors. Overall, their results indicate that the role of audit committees and
independence of audit committee members reflects on high audit quality and auditor
independence.
Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009) study audit committee characteristics and
investigate if they are related to external auditor changes. The auditor change is
subsequent to events such as: disagreement with management, resignation of the
auditor, disagreement over audit fees, and qualified audit opinions. They use a sample
of firms (that appear simultaneously on Auditor-Trak and the NYSE, ASE or NASD)
that switched auditors from 1993-2001 because of one of the following: a
disagreement between management and the external auditor; auditor resignations from
the audit engagement due to independence issues; audit fee disputes and receipt of a
qualified opinion. Their final sample is reduced to 60 firms because of lack of
financial data. Their results show that an external auditor is more likely to be
supported by an audit committee that is more independent, has more financial
expertise and more firm specific knowledge. These findings suggest that the increased
scrutiny of audit committee members has made them more effective in the likelihood
of an unfavorable event such as those mentioned in this study.
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Audit Committee Composition and Interaction with Internal Auditors
Another important element in the corporate governance mosaic is internal
auditing. Effective communication with internal auditing can lead to better monitoring
by audit committee members. Both are involved in monitoring of internal controls and
deterrence of wrongdoing and false financial reporting, albeit to a different degree.
Although the powers and the roles differ significantly, their goals overlap and one of
their main objectives is to promote accurate financial reporting.
Scarbrough et al. (1998) investigate the association between audit committee
composition and the level of interaction with internal auditing. They use several
measures in their study such as (1) role of the audit committee in decisions leading to
dismissal of the chief internal auditor, (2) meetings between the audit committee and
the chief internal auditor and (3) review of the internal auditing program and results by
the audit committee. They conduct a survey of chief internal auditors of Canadian
manufacturing companies. They find that the audit committee was involved in the
dismissal of the chief internal auditor in 48 percent of the respondents’ companies.
Their results also show that the level of interaction between audit committee members
and internal auditing was low. Sixty nine percent of audit committees reviewed the
internal auditing program and results and only 59 percent of the audit committees had
regular meetings with the chief internal auditor.
Raghunandan et al. (2001) gathered responses from chief internal auditors of
public companies and find that only 68 percent had audit committees without inside or
gray directors and with at least one member with an accounting or finance
background. Their findings also indicate that audit committees that did not have inside
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or gray directors and had at least one member with accounting or finance expertise are
more likely to (a) have longer meetings with the chief internal auditor, (b) provide
access to the chief internal auditor and (c) review the internal audit program and
review management’s interaction with internal audit.
Barua et al. (2010) study the association between audit committee
characteristics and investment in internal auditing. They use a sample of 181 firms
that have an active internal audit function for the fiscal years ending between August
1, 2001 and July 31, 2002. They find that companies that had long-tenure audit
committee members and had an auditing expert on the audit committee spent less
resources on internal auditing. This study shows that an auditing expert coupled with
long tenure directors may be able to substitute for internal auditing to some extent.
They also find that the investment in internal auditing is positively related to the
number of audit committee meetings.
Abbott et al. (2010) document the association between audit committee
characteristics and internal audit. They conduct a survey of 134 chief internal auditors
from Fortune 1000 firms investigating resources allocated to internal audit activities
during fiscal year 2005. They obtain data to measure the relative control of audit
committee over the internal audit function using three components of the audit
committee/internal audit relationship: reporting duties, termination rights, and
budgetary control. The authors hypothesize that the audit committee’s objective to
avoid a financial misstatement is positively associated with an increased internal audit
focus on internal controls. They find that audit committees that have a greater
oversight role over the internal audit function allocate a larger proportion of the
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internal audit hours towards internal controls.
In summary prior research has examined a variety of issues related to the
interaction between internal auditing and audit committee composition. In general, the
evidence from prior studies suggests that audit committees that have solely
independent directors are more likely to have a higher quality interaction with internal
auditing.
Audit Committee Composition and Financial Reporting
Accruals
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) examine companies with two types of
financial reporting problems (SEC enforcement actions and material restatements of
quarterly earnings) and compared them to those that did not have any financial
reporting problems. In their survey, they examine 51 companies with either an SEC
enforcement action and/or material restatements of quarterly earnings financial
reporting problems for the period 1985-1989. Their results indicate that companies
that had problems did not have audit committees comprising solely of outside
directors. Problem companies were also more likely to have no CPAs on their audit
committees compared to no problem companies. Lastly, they also find that only
23percent of the problem companies held regular audit committee meetings.
DeZoort and Salterio (2001) examine how 68 Canadian audit committee
members react to a dispute between the auditor and management over a material
accounting issue. The study is conducted as an experimental task and is created with
the help of audit partners, a national office accounting consultation partner, a
corporate director and accounting professors. The authors find that audit committee
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members who are independent and possess prior audit experience will be more likely
to advocate a “substance” approach in an accounting policy dispute with management.
Klein (2002) examines if the magnitude of abnormal accruals is associated
with audit committee independence. Her sample comprises of S&P 500 firms, and her
analysis covers the years 1991-1993. Her results show that abnormal accruals are high
for companies where the majority of audit committee directors were not independent.
The results are more significant when there was a reduction in independence level
(from majority-independent to minority-independent) either on the board or on the
audit committee. Her findings provide evidence that earnings management is
negatively associated to independent boards and audit committees.
Bedard et al. (2004) find that the presence of a financial expert is negatively
associated with annual discretionary accruals. They use a matched pair design; one
group had a high level of abnormal accruals and the other a relatively low level of
abnormal accruals in the year 1996. They find that earnings management is less
pronounced in firms where audit committees comprised of independent members and
financial experts. They also find that a formalized charter empowers audit committee
members with the required skills to mitigate aggressive earnings management.
Krishnamoorthy et al. (2002) conducted a survey which was sent to audit
partners and managers to study their perception of financial reporting quality and to
identify factors that impact audit committee effectiveness. 48 percent of the
respondents stated that audit committee members lacked the financial acumen which is
required to obtain a high financial reporting quality. Several respondents expressed
concerns such as the lack of audit committee willingness to support external auditors
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in case of a disagreement with management. The respondents mentioned that the audit
committees were not strong enough to curtail financial misstatements and deter fraud.
Yang and Krishnan (2005) examine the association between earnings
management and several audit committee characteristics such as independence,
frequency of meetings, financial expertise, stock ownership, outside directorships,
tenure and size of the audit committee. Their sample comprises of 896 firm-year
observations for the years 1996-2000. They find that the number of outside
directorships held by audit committee directors is negatively associated with quarterly
discretionary accruals. They also find that stock ownership in a company can erode
independence of audit committee members as evidenced by presence of earnings
management. Lastly, they find that average tenure is negatively associated with
quarterly earnings management.
In summary, prior studies have examined many different time periods and
samples to examine the association between the composition of audit committee
members and the quality of financial reporting. The evidence from such studies
indicate that audit committee member characteristics (as measured by level of
independence, presence of experts, number of meetings, presence of an audit
committee charter etc.) can impact the quality of financial reporting.
Restatements
The quality of financial reporting can also be measured by the number of
restatements and internal control weakness disclosures. Abbott et al. (2004) study a
group of companies that restated their financial statements at least once during 1991 to
1999 (88 firms) and compare them to a control group of companies that did not restate
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(88 firms). They find that the likelihood of a restatement is lower for those firms
where the audit committee is comprised of fully independent members and/or includes
at least one financial expert. They also find that companies that had active audit
committees had lesser restatements compared to the control group. Their finding echo
the recommendations of the BRC and others who have argued for independent audit
committees, presence of at least one member with financial expertise, and more audit
committee meetings—all of which lead to effective monitoring by audit committees.
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) provide empirical evidence between audit
committee composition and the likelihood of a misstatement. They examine 159 U.S.
public companies that restated their earnings in 2000 or 2001 and identify a sample of
159 firms that did not restate (control group). They find that the probability of a
restatement is lower in companies where audit committees have presence of
independent directors with financial expertise; however the probability is higher for
companies where the CEO belongs to the founding family. Their results suggest that
independent directors who possess financial expertise are value-adding members that
provide effective monitoring over the company’s financial reporting.
Internal Control Reporting
DeZoort (1998) conducts a study by contacting board chairpersons from a
random sample of 100 companies listed on the NYSE, ASE and NASDAQ National
Market System. Each board chairperson is requested to encourage their audit
committee members to participate in the study. Their final sample consists of 87
respondents to analyze if experience has an effect on audit committee member’s
oversight judgment. These respondents complete an internal control oversight task and
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their judgments are evaluated by the author. This study uses an analysis-of-variance
approach to test for differences among inexperienced audit committee members, audit
committee members with auditing experience and external auditors. The author finds
that audit committee members who have domain and task specific knowledge, i.e.
those that have prior experience in auditing and internal controls made similar
judgment decisions as external auditors in the evaluation of internal controls compared
to their counterparts who did not have such prior experience.
Krishnan (2005) conducts a study to analyze the association between audit
committee composition and internal control reporting. She uses a matched-sample
design and identifies companies that disclose internal control problems in Form 8-Ks
and had a change in auditor (1994-2000); for the control group she uses companies
that changed auditors but did not have an internal control issues. Her final sample
comprises of 128 firms that have internal control problems and 128 control firms that
did not have such problems. She finds a negative association between the presence of
independent members on the audit committee and occurrences of internal control
weaknesses. Additionally, she also finds that presence of experts (financial expertise)
and internal control problems are also negatively associated with each other. Her
findings indicate that presence of experts seems to matter and have an influence on
financial reporting quality.
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) identify 90 companies that reported internal
control weaknesses between November 15, 2004 and March 1, 2005. Their control
group includes companies in the same industry that did not report any deficiencies in
internal control. They find that companies with internal control weaknesses were less
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likely to have financial experts on the audit committee. They also find that frequent
audit committee meetings were related to timely reporting of internal control
weaknesses.
Zhang et al. (2007) identify 208 firms with material internal control problems
under SOX 302 or 404 from November 15, 2004 to July 31, 2005. These problems are
disclosed in the firms’ 8-K, 10-Q and 10-K. The use a matched-pair design in their
study and collect data for 208 firms without internal control weaknesses. In their
univariate analyses they find that 75 percent of the audit committee members of the
sample firms are financial experts whereas 83 percent of the audit committee members
in the control sample are financial experts. These differences are statistically
significant (1%) and indicate that firms with audit committee financial experts are less
prone to have internal control problems. Their multivariate tests indicate that firms
with internal control problems have more frequent board meetings and presence of
experts (both accounting and non-accounting financial experts) helps in improved
monitoring.
Goh (2009) investigates if audit committee characteristics are associated with a
company’s timeliness in the remediation of material weaknesses in internal control.
This study finds that firms with larger audit committees and greater proportion of
nonaccounting financial expertise will take steps to remediate problems related to
internal controls in a timely manner. These results suggest that size of the audit
committee does matter and even nonaccounting financial expertise is useful because it
assists in a timely remediation of internal controls.
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Naiker and Sharma (2009) conduct a study to examine the influence of
affiliated former audit partners and unaffiliated former audit partners on the audit
committee and internal control deficiencies that require adequate disclosures. They
posit that audit committee members who have been audit partners on the engagement
in their previous roles would be more effective monitors of internal control
weaknesses compared to their counterparts. Their sample comprises of 1,225 firms
that make SOX 404 disclosures for the 2004 fiscal year ending on or after November
14, 2003. They find that presence of such expertise (prior audit partners) was
associated with lower number of reported internal control deficiencies.
In summary, the above mentioned studies show that audit committee
characteristics such as the presence of financial experts are important in the internal
control reporting framework. Section 404 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act requires that
internal control weaknesses be disclosed in reports by management in a timely
manner. Audit committee members can play a crucial role in effective monitoring of
internal controls and financial reporting by maintaining constant communication with
management, external auditors and internal auditors.
Diligence of Audit Committee Members
The investing community and standard-setters have called for presence of
more diligent audit committees. One measure of audit committee diligence is the
number of meetings held by audit committees. Frequent meetings allow for a smoother
communication between audit committees and others, such as external and internal
auditors.
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Levitt (1998) notes that “qualified, committed, independent and tough-mind
audit committees represent the most reliable guardians of the public interest”. He also
cited that there were too many instances where audit committees did not exert their
roles as effective monitors. He gives an example of a company where the audit
committee meets only twice a year, for fifteen minutes just before the board meeting;
he contrasted this with the audit committee of another company that meets twelve
times a year before each board meeting. While I expand on the determinants and
consequences of audit committee meeting frequency in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, I
briefly describe some of the studies associated with audit committee meetings.
Raghunandan and Rama (2007) examine 319 firms to ascertain the
determinants of audit committee diligence. They find that there is a higher frequency
in the number of meetings of audit committees of firms that are larger, have higher
outside block-holding, operate in a litigious environment and have more board
meetings. Prior research shows that more frequent audit committee meetings are
associated with reduced probability of financial reporting problems (McMullen and
Raghunandan 1996), fraud (Beasley et al. 1999), sporadic auditor changes that are
deemed suspicious (Archambeault and DeZoort 2001) and restatements (Abbott et al.
2004). Raghunandan et al. (2001) surveyed chief internal auditors (CIA) and find that
audit committees that were fully independent tended to have longer meetings with
CIAs and were more likely to provide access to CIAs and review internal audit
proposals and results.
In summary, audit committees constitute an important element in the corporate
governance mosaic. An effective audit committee is more likely to be associated with
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higher quality financial reporting. This in turn suggests that the appointment and exit
of audit committee directors will be of interest to investors and other financial
statement users. I examine these issues in greater detail in the next two chapters.
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III: MARKET REACTIONS TO APPOINTMENT OF AUDIT COMMITTEE
DIRECTORS
The previous chapter discussed the notion of audit committees as an integral
part of the corporate governance system, and the role of the committee in the financial
reporting process. As also discussed in the previous chapter, issues related to the
composition of the audit committee have attracted significant attention from
legislators and regulators. Such attention is supported by empirical evidence from
numerous academic studies suggesting that the composition of the audit committee is
associated with a variety of processes and outcomes related to financial reporting.
Hence, it is likely that any changes in the composition of the audit committee
would be of interest to financial statement users. Recognizing the importance of
directors in general in the monitoring process, the SEC requires that any appointment
or exit of a director be reported promptly in a Form 8-K to the Commission.
Companies use Form 8-K to disclose certain corporate events that occur
between the filings of the 10 Q. In 1977, when the SEC established the filing of the 8K, corporations were given five business day and 15 calendar day deadlines and SEC
had to consider problems associated with paper filing of the 8-K. However, since the
advent of the internet and EDGAR electronic filing, it has become easier for
corporations to file as soon as the event occurs.
The SEC proposed in June of 2002 that companies file 8-Ks “within two
business days after the occurrence of a triggering event.” SEC (2002b) The SEC’s
move towards a more spontaneous filing emphasizes the importance of real-time
disclosures to investors and the business community. The SEC also proposed adding
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items that needed to be reported in the 8-K such as disclosure about the resignation of
a director.
“Finally, we propose to expand the current Form 8-K item that requires
disclosure about the resignation of a director to also require disclosure
regarding the departure of a director for reasons other than a disagreement or
removal for cause, the appointment or departure of a principal officer, and the
election of new directors.”
Under the old rules, Item 6 of the 8-K required disclosure only if there is a director
departure as a result of disagreement with management. The burden of such a
disclosure was entirely on the exiting director, who needed to provide a letter to the
company discussing the disagreement. The proposed rules also cited a disclosure in
the 8-K when a corporate appoints certain new officers and directors. The SEC (2004)
noted as follows:
“This proposed item also would require disclosure if the company appoints a
new principal executive officer, president, principal financial officer, principal
accounting officer, principal operating officer, or person serving an equivalent
function. If such an event occurs, proposed Item 5.02(c) would require the
company to disclose the officer's name, position, the date of the appointment, a
brief description of any arrangement or understanding pursuant to which the
officer was selected as an officer, the information required regarding the
officer's background and certain related transactions with the company, and a
brief description of the material terms of any employment agreement between
the company and that officer. In addition, if a new director is elected to the
board, except by a vote of security holders at an annual meeting, proposed Item
5.02(d) would require disclosure of the new director's name, the election date,
a brief description of any arrangement or understanding pursuant to which the
new director was selected as a director, any committees to which the new
director has been, or at the time of the disclosure is expected to be, named, and
information regarding certain related transactions between the new director and
the company. Certain information required to be disclosed regarding new
officers and directors would be permitted to be filed by amendment after the
company determines this information.”
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Effective, August 23, 2004, SEC adopted the final rules surrounding disclosures made
in the 8-K. The SEC states that issuers subject to the reporting requirements of Section
13(a) and Section 15(d) of the Exchange act were required to file Form 8-K within
four business days of a triggering event. Paragraph (c) of Item 5.02 requires (SEC
2004):
“disclosure if the company appoints a new principal executive officer,
president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, principal
operating officer or person performing similar functions. The company must
disclose the officer's name, position, the date of the appointment, information
regarding the background of the officer and certain related transactions with
the company, and a brief description of the material terms of any employment
agreement between the company and the officer.”

In this part of my dissertation, I investigate if there is a market reaction to the
appointment of audit committee directors disclosed in Form 8-K filings with the SEC.
There have been only two studies have looked at market reaction to appointment of
audit committee members, but both of the studies examine audit committee
appointments the pre-SOX period. I extend prior research in this area by examining
the market reaction to the appointment of audit committee directors in the post-SOX
period.
Related Research and Hypotheses
Davidson et al. (2004) hypothesize that the market will react more positively to
the appointment of a director with financial expertise. They examine a sample of 136
voluntary appointment announcements from 1990-2001 and find that investors seem
to reward firms who hired audit committee directors with financial expertise.
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Davidson et al. (2004) had a relatively smaller sample because they limited their
sample selection to those firms that had press releases and public announcements.
DeFond et al. (2005) study a sample of 702 newly appointed outside directors
to audit committees from 1993 to 2002. The authors find a positive market reaction
when accounting financial experts are appointed to the audit committee. They also test
if appointment of an expert when there is no existing expert on the audit committee
leads to a positive market reaction. In addition, they study the reaction of the market
when the number of experts increases on the audit committee. They expect the market
to reward firms that attempt to increase their monitoring by appointment of an expert
in both cases: when an expert is present prior to the new appointment and when an
expert is not present. As expected, they find that the cumulative abnormal return is
1.7% (significant at 5%, two-tailed) when there is an increase in the number of
experts. This finding resonates with market belief that increasing the strength of
experts on the audit committee will lead to effective monitoring.
Both of the above studies use data from the pre-SOX period. In the post-SOX
environment, there are two different arguments about the market reaction to the
appointment of expert directors to the audit committee.
One argument is that there is heightened awareness of the need for good audit
committees given the emphasis placed by the legislators and the SEC on the
composition of audit committees. Hence, the market reaction to the news of an audit
committee director with financial expertise will be more positive than in the pre-SOX
period.
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The counter argument is that in the post-SOX period all listed corporations are
required to have at least one financial expert present on the audit committee. Hence,
the appointment of another audit committee director with financial expertise may not
matter as much compared to the pre-SOX period.
Thus, there are differing arguments about the effects of an expert director to
the audit committee in the post-SOX period. Ultimately, this is an empirical question
about which I seek to provide some empirical evidence.
Similar to Davidson et al. (2004) and DeFond et al. (2005), I divide my sample
into three categories of experts. Audit/CPA experts are those directors who have audit
experience in a public accounting firm and/or are professionally qualified such as
Certified Public Accountants (CPA), Chartered Accountants (CA) and Certified
Financial Analysts (CFA). The second category of experts is Accounting/Finance
which encompasses all those directors who have had finance or accounting
backgrounds. For example, a Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Accounting Officer
(CAO) Treasurer, or Vice President-Finance would fall under this category. Lastly,
Other experts are those that are neither Audit/CPA nor Accounting/Finance experts. If
the first of the two arguments discussed above is valid, then the appointment of an
Audit/CPA expert should elicit the most positive market reaction, followed by the
appointment of an Accounting/Finance expert; the appointment of Other expert should
have the least positive market reaction. If the second argument discussed above is
valid, then there should be no significant differences in the market reaction to the
different types of experts; a stronger form of the hypothesis would also suggest that
there will be no positive market reaction to the appointment of any type of expert.
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Thus, my first hypothesis, stated in the null form is:

H01:

The market reaction to the appointment of audit committee directors with and
without financial expertise will not be significantly different.

I also examine if the market reaction to the appointment of audit committee
experts varies depending on the number of experts already present in the committee.
Here again, there are two arguments. The first argument states that there is a premium
for hiring more than one audit committee financial expert. The counter argument is
that, given that there is already one or more experts present, the addition of yet another
expert would not be deemed to be valuable by the market. Therefore, similar to
DeFond et al. (2005), I calculate the number of audit committee financial experts prior
to the new appointment to check if the increase in the number of experts post
appointment has any differential impact on the market. Thus, my second hypothesis, in
the null form, is:

H02:

The market reaction to increase in strength of the audit committees will not
differ based on the number of experts already present on the audit committee.
The number of board memberships held by directors has come under increased

scrutiny in recent years. Some have argued that the number of board memberships is a
positive signal about the quality of a director. This argument holds that the reward for
good performance by a director comes in the form of additional board memberships;
hence, multiple board memberships is a market-based proxy measure for the quality of
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a director. In this view, a director who serves on other boards is considered an asset
on the audit committee because serving on other boards is perceived as an indicator of
a high quality director. Therefore, when a ‘busy’ director is appointed to the audit
committee, the market will react positively.
Ferris et al. (2003) investigate the number of external appointments held by
corporate directors. Their sample consists of those firms with at least $100 million in
total assets at the beginning of 1995 for which the director data is available. The final
sample comprises of 5,979 directors (653 firms). The mean (median) number of
directorships held per director is 1.60 (1.40). They conduct additional analyses and
find positive market reaction to announcements of appointments of director who serve
on multiple boards. Their results indicate that the historical performance of a firm
tends to follow the director and affects the number of directorships held by the
director, and his ability to attract other board appointments in the future. They refer to
this phenomenon as the reputational effect in the market for corporate directors.
The counter argument is that multiple directorships imply a busy director; this
also means that there is less time available for monitoring a company, and hence the
quality of monitoring will be adversely affected (U.S. Senate 2002). Under this view,
appointing a director with other board memberships is negative. This view may be
particularly relevant in the post-SOX period, given the heightened expectations from
directors in general and audit committee directors in particular.
The above discussion leads to my third hypothesis. In the null form, my
hypothesis is:
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H03:

The market reaction to appointment of a director will not be related to the
number of other board memberships held by a director.

SAMPLE AND DATA
I begin with a list of audit committee director appointments that were disclosed
in Form 8-K filings with the SEC firms between January 1, 2008 and December 31,
2008 per the Audit Analytics database. As shown in Table 1, from this initial list of
1,351 audit committee director appointments, I delete 3 duplicate observations where
the same director appointment was reported twice. I also delete 114 audit committee
departures from foreign firms, because there are significant institutional differences
between the USA and other countries; the focus of my study is on the USA only. I
then delete 348 appointments where there were multiple audit committee directors
appointed at the same time; this is because in such instances it is difficult to isolate the
effects associated with a specific director. Next, I delete 115 appointments that were
accompanied by audit committee director departures, again because it is difficult to
disentangle the departure news from the appointment news. Another 231 appointments
are deleted because of missing permno (CRSP identifier) and ticker information. After
such deletions, I have 540 director appointments with relevant data. I further delete
180 observations where there are other news announcements contemporaneous with
audit committee director appointment. My final sample comprises of 360 single
director audit committee appointments.
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RESULTS
In Table 2, Panel A, I present descriptive statistics for the sample of audit
committee director appointments. I note that the mean (median) total assets is
10,576.13 (884.75) million, total revenues is 4,515.34 (392.37) and market value is
4,191.43 (318.24). The size of firms in my sample is similar to Defond et al. (2005)
where the mean (median) total assets is 10,317.35 (1,223.00). In Panel B of Table 2, I
segregate the sample by industry using the industry classifications provided by Dr.
French. I find that excluding the other category; high-tech industry had the largest
appointments (22 percent) followed by healthcare (13 percent) and manufacturing (9
percent).
I conduct further analysis to study the market reaction to appointment of
experts. I first identify those who are classified as an “audit committee financial
expert” by the company, based on subsequent proxy statement disclosures. I also
obtain data about the audit committee director from the brief biographical information
available in proxy statements. Using such information, I classify audit committee
directors as either as Audit/CPA expert, Accounting/Finance Expert or Other expert.
I obtain the 3-day (-1 to + 1) and 5-day (-2 to +2) cumulative abnormal return
(CAR) with value-weighted market adjustment from Eventus. The estimation period
ends on day -10 relative to the announcement date; the minimum and maximum
estimation periods are 100 and 255 days, respectively. I selected CRSP Value
weighted market index and the benchmark for the estimation of the abnormal returns
used is the market model. I calculate the statistical significance of the cumulative
abnormal returns using T-tests and median tests.
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I am able to obtain CAR data for 540 of the 1,351 audit committee director
appointments for 2008; however I deleted 180 observations because there were some
other contemporaneous news announcements surrounding the 8-K date. If an event
occurred within 5 days of the 8-K filing, I consider it as a concurrent event. This
yields a final sample of 360 single-director appointments to the audit committee. Onehundred and sixty eight of the 360 (47 percent) appointments are of expert directors. I
compare the proportion of audit committee financial experts to prior research and find
that Davidson et al. (2004) have 64 percent accounting experts and DeFond et al.
(2005) have 74 percent accounting experts. I conducted the binomial proportions test
to check if the proportion of experts is significantly different from the hypothesized
value of 50% and I find no such difference.
In Table 3, I provide market reaction to the full sample of 360 audit committee
director appointments. As seen in Panel A of Table 3, for the total sample of 360
observations, neither the 3-day nor the 5-day mean CARs are significant. Fifty-one
percent of the sample has a negative 3-day CAR, while the proportion is 50 percent
for the 5-day CAR.
Panel B of Table 3 shows that the CARs when the sample is partitioned based
on the type of incoming audit committee director. For the 168 expert director
appointments, the mean 3- day and 5-day CARs are -0.006 and -0.005, respectively;
neither is statistically significant at conventional levels. Fifty percent of the expert
sample has a negative 3-day CAR, while the proportion is 52 percent for the 5-day
CAR. For the 192 expert director appointments, the mean 3- day and 5-day CARs are
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0.001 and 0.000, respectively; again, neither is statistically significant at conventional
levels. Fifty-one percent of the non-expert sample has a positive 3-day CAR, while the
proportion is 48 percent for the 5-day CAR.
In Table 4, I provide a detailed analysis of the market reaction associated with
incoming directors that are Audit/CPA experts, Accounting/Finance and Other experts.
As seen in Table 4, there are 168 audit committee financial experts and 192 not-audit
committee financial experts. Of the 168 audit committee financial experts, 67 percent
are classified as Audit/CPA experts; 32 percent are Accounting/Finance experts.
Based on results from Davidson et al. (2004) and DeFond et al. (2005), one
would predict the market will react positively to the news of appointment of an audit
committee financial expert, and that the reaction would be more positive when a
director is Audit/CPA expert. However, the results do not support such predictions. For
the 113 Audit/CPA expert director appointments, the mean 3- day and 5-day CARs are
-0.005 and -0.011, respectively; neither is statistically significant at conventional
levels. Forty-eight percent of the Audit/CPA expert sample have a negative 3-day
CAR, while the proportion is 58 percent for the 5-day CAR.
Interestingly, I find that 60 of the 192 (31 percent) of audit committee
directors, not classified as audit committee financial experts are Audit/CPA experts.
The mean 3-day CAR associated with such appointment is 2.2 %, which is statistically
significant. This reaction suggests that the market is rewarding firms for hiring
Audit/CPA experts even when such experts do not ultimately earn the title of “audit
committee financial experts”. This result shows that presence of a director who
possesses such expertise is valued by the market. However, why should the market
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reward the appointment of experts when they are not classified by the firm as an audit
committee financial expert but not when they are so classified? I do not have an
answer to this question, other than to say that the results are what they are.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that even for this group of audit committee financial
expert appointments, the 5-day CAR is not statistically significant. In addition, the
median tests also are not significant, for either the 3-day or 5-day CAR.
I also find that an additional 17 of the 192 (9 percent) of audit committee
directors, not classified as audit committee financial experts are Accounting/Finance
experts. The mean 3-day and 5-day CARs associated with such appointment are not
statistically significant; similarly, the median tests also indicate that the market
reaction is not statistically significant.
Before I move on to the analysis of other experts, it is interesting to note that
77 of the 192 appointments of audit committee directors who are not classified as
audit committee financial experts by the company can in fact be deemed to be
appointments of auditing or accounting experts. Why do the firms not classify such
directors as experts? This is an interesting issue for future research. In this context, it
is interesting to note that Carcello et al. (2006) who examine disclosures of 400
companies (100 Fortune 500 and 300 drawn randomly from NYSE, Nasdaq National
Market System and Nasdaq National Dealer Quotation) find that a very high number
of firms (98 percent) comply with the SEC disclosure requirement concerning
financial experts, however, the extent of the disclosure varied across the sample. For
example, only 5 percent of their sample provide a significant discussion concerning
financial experts. They also find that most designated audit committee financial
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experts do not have accounting or finance backgrounds. The authors speculate that
firms’ failure to appoint an audit committee financial expert with an accounting or
finance background may mitigate the financial reporting benefit derived from the
presence of such experts. Lastly, they find that firms that were large, operated in a
litigious environment and have active audit committees were more likely to have a
designated audit committee financial expert.
Finally, 115 of the 192 (60 percent) of audit committee directors, not classified
as audit committee financial experts, are neither Audit/CPA nor Accounting/Finance
experts. The mean 3-day and 5-day CARs associated with such appointments are not
statistically significant; similarly, the median tests also indicate that the market
reaction is not statistically significant for such appointments.

Market Reaction: Partitioned by Number of Experts present on the audit committee
post appointment
In Table 5, I partition the sample by the number of experts present on the audit
committee post appointment. DeFond et al. (2005) find that an audit committee
financial expert is more likely to succeed in a strong corporate governance
environment. My results reinforce such views, as I find that the market reacts
positively (and significant) to the news of appointment of audit committee financial
expert when two or more such directors are already present on the audit committee.
It is evident in Table 5 that when there are four or more audit committee
financial experts present on the audit committee post the new appointment, the market
reacts positively. The 3-day and 5-day CARs when the new appointment results in the
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audit committee having four or more experts are 3.0% (significant at p < .01) and
3.1% (significant at p < .10), respectively. In contrast, neither the 3-day nor the 5-day
CAR are significant when there is only one or no expert on the audit committee after
the appointment of the director to the audit committee.

Market Reaction: Busy Director Appointment
Table 6 presents the market reaction to the number of other boards a new
director serves on. There are 213 audit committee directors who do not serve on any
other board, while 147 serve on one more other company boards. The 3-day and 5day CARs for those appointments where the appointee does not serve on any other
board is -0.005 and -0.007, respectively; neither is significant at conventional levels.
The corresponding CARs for those appointments where the appointee serves on one or
more other boards is 0.002 and 0.004, respectively; again, neither is significant at
conventional levels.
In Table 7, I provide additional information about the market reaction to the
appointment of different types of directors. I partition the sample based on whether or
not the director appointed to the audit committee was already a member of the
company’s board (i.e., an internal appointment) or if such a person was appointed a
member of the board only while simultaneously being appointed to the board (i.e., a
new external appointment). I also partition these two categories by the type of expert.
As seen in the Table 7, in none of the partitions is the market reaction statistically
significant.
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SUMMARY
This part of my dissertation examines the market reaction to audit committee
director appointments. I find that overall there is no significant market reaction to the
full sample of single-director appointments. I also find that, surprisingly, the market
does not react positively to the news of appointment of an audit committee financial
expert when a director is either Audit/CPA expert of Accounting/Finance expert.
However, I find that 31 percent of audit committee directors not designated as an audit
committee financial expert can nevertheless be classified as Audit/CPA experts; the
market reaction to the appointment of such experts is positive and significant. Even
here, it is only the mean 3-day CAR that is significant; the 5-day CAR is not
significant, nor are results from the median test with either the 3-day or 5-day CAR.
Taken together, the results suggest that the market does not react as strongly in the
post-SOX period to the appointment of an audit committee expert as in the pre-SOX
period.
This chapter focused on the appointment of audit committee directors. In the
next chapter, I examine market reaction to departure of audit committee directors.
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IV: MARKET REACTIONS TO DEPARTURE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE
DIRECTORS
As noted in Chapter 2, starting since the 1940s the Securities and Exchange
Commission has emphasized the role of independent audit committees in ensuring
high quality financial reporting (SEC 1999). Chapter 2 also provides a detailed
discussion of the many regulatory and legislative actions in recent years that have
focused on the composition of audit committees, including specific provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. In Chapter 3, I provide a summary of prior
research related to the composition of audit committees and the many consequences
associated with variations in audit committee composition. Yet, as noted in Chapter 3,
there is a paucity of research related to the appointment and, more importantly, the
departure of audit committee directors.
Recent actions by the SEC reinforce the idea that the departure of directors
could be value-relevant to investors and other financial statement users. In August
2004, the SEC (2004) made a final rule change to 8-K filings. Item 5.02 – Departure
of Directors or Principal Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Principal
Officers notes as follows:
“Under the revised item, if a director has resigned or refuses to stand for reelection to the board of directors since the date of the last annual meeting of
shareholders because of a disagreement with the company, known to an
executive officer of the company, on any matter relating to the company's
operations, policies or practices, or if a director has been removed for cause
from the board of directors, the company must disclose:
1) the date of the director's resignation, refusal to stand for re-election or
removal;
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2) any positions held by the director on any committee of the board of directors
at the time of the director's resignation, refusal to stand for re-election or
removal; and
3) a brief description of the circumstances representing the disagreement that
management believes caused, in whole or in part, the director's resignation,
refusal to stand for re-election or removal.”
Such actions by the SEC to provide more timely and real-time disclosures
regarding director departures motivates this part of my dissertation. In this part, I
examine the market reaction to audit committee director departures.

Related Research and Hypotheses
I first examine prior research on director departures in general. I then discuss
prior research related to departures of audit committee directors.

Outside-Director Turnover
Gupta and Fields (2009) empirically examine board member resignation and
the importance of such resignations in light of the firm’s governance structure. Their
study seeks to examine investors’ perceptions of the importance of changes in board
independence. They use a sample of 744 director resignation announcements from
1990-2003 and find that an outside director resignation led to, an average, a loss of
1.22% in market value over a three day period surrounding the announcement. These
results were statistically significant at the 1% level. They also find that when there is a
net decrease in board independence within a one year period following board of
director resignation, the market reaction is -1.17%. Their results indicate that
investors’ perceive a loss in value when an outside director resigns and use this

54

information to evaluate the strength of the board. Their results hold good after
controlling for firm performance.
Dewally et al. (2009) examine the announcements of outside director
resignations. While some directors leave quietly, there are some that criticize the firm
and publicly disclose their reasons for exit. Some directors may be motivated to
publicly criticize their firms at the time of exit to protect their own reputation. Their
sample consists of director resignations that were publicly announced in the Wall St.
Journal and Lexis/Nexis database from 1990 to 2003. Their final sample consists of 69
director resignations for 52 separate announcements for 49 firms. They also find that
resignations of directors due to conflicts with management often result in various
internal changes within management and positive stock market reactions. Overall,
their study indicates that director resignation (with or without conflict) forces the
board to rethink and analyze their corporate governance model and can help protect
shareholders’ interests.
Asthana and Balsam (2010) provide evidence to suggest that corporate
directors are more likely to exit when firm performance declines and the firm becomes
more risky (for example, a higher chance of bankruptcy). Their sample comprises of
51,388 observations (13,084 directors) who served 1,065 firms during the period
1997-2004. They also provide evidence showing that directors may pre-empt the
decline of their firms and exit in advance of such performance, thus protecting their
wealth and reputation. Their results hold good in a multivariate model after controlling
for director age, tenure, gender and firm size.
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The above studies look at departure of board members in general and the
impact of such resignations on firm performance. However, there is little research on
the departure of audit committee members. In the next sub-section, I provide an
overview of three academic studies pertaining specifically to audit committee director
turnover.
Audit Committee Director Turnover
Srinivasan (2005) investigates a sample of 409 companies that restated their
earnings from 1997 to 2000 to examine repercussions for audit committee directors
after restatements are announced. He finds that subsequent to a restatement, director
turnover is 48 percent for income-decreasing restatements and 28 percent for incomeincreasing restatement. He concludes that penalties in terms of the labor market are
highest for outside-directors who are associated with an income-decreasing
restatement. His results show that directors associated with restating firms lose more
directorships (at other firms) compared to the control sample. There are also legal
ramifications for this sample; the SEC issued an AAER against 65 of these 409
companies. This study also finds a negative market reaction to appointment of a
director who concurrently presides on the board of a restated firm. The firms that share
directors with restating firms experience a cumulative abnormal return of -0.24%
(significant at the 10% level) and the cumulative abnormal return was -1.41% when
the CEO served as a director in a restating firm. These results suggest that the market
is skeptical about hiring directors who are associated with “tainted” firms and the
market reaction is stronger for a shared CEO/director because of the increased role of
the CEO in the management process.
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As noted in the previous chapter, Davidson et al. (2004) examine 136 audit
committee director appointments during 1990-2001 and find that investors reward
firms that hired audit committee directors with financial expertise. Davidson et al.
(2004) hypothesize, and find, that the market will react more positively to a company
that appoints a director with financial expertise. DeFond et al. (2005) study a sample
of 702 newly appointed outside directors to audit committees from 1993 to 2002, and
find a positive market reaction when accounting financial experts are appointed to the
audit committee.
In summary, while regulators and legislators have long shown an interest in the
functioning of audit committees, there is limited research related to the departure of
audit committee directors. Two prior studies show that the appointment of an audit
committee expert director is associated with a positive market reaction. Both of these
two studies examine the pre-SOX period. I extend the literature on audit committees
by first providing descriptive evidence about audit committee director turnover and
then examining the market reaction to the departure of different types of directors in
the post-SOX era.
There are two different arguments related to expectations about the market
reaction to the departure of expert directors from audit committees in the post-SOX
period. One argument is that the relative importance of expert directors is higher in the
post-SOX period, so the departure of an expert director will elicit a negative market
reaction. The counter argument is that in the post-SOX period all companies are
expected to have at least one expert director, so even if one expert leaves it is likely
that there will soon be another expert director appointment to the audit committee.
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Under this latter view, it is not a significant event if an expert director departs from the
audit committee; so, there will not be a negative market reaction to departures of
expert directors from audit committees.
While there are arguments on both sides, given the prior research evidence, I
make a directional prediction in my next hypothesis. In light of the evidence in
Davidson et al. (2004) and DeFond et al. (2005), my hypothesis is:

H04:

The departure of an Accounting Expert director from the audit committee will
elicit a significantly negative market reaction.

Director tenure is an issue that has started to receive attention from good
governance advocates and others. During the Enron hearings held by the U.S. Senate’s
Committee on Governmental Affairs (U.S. Senate 2002) one of the issues that was
raised was whether the audit committee directors had been on the audit committee for
too long, and hence were too close to management. While increased director tenure
may lead to better knowledge of the company and perhaps contribute to enhanced
monitoring, others argue that too long a tenure leads a director to become complacent
(Kesner 1988; Vafeas 2003). A survey by Heidrick and Struggles (2006) finds 22
percent of companies have term-limits for their directors, and that this proportion has
more than doubled since 2000. KPMG’s Audit Committee Institute recently released a
report (KPMG 2009) which states the ten to-do’s for audit committees in 2010, one of
the points emphasized leadership of audit committee members and to evaluate of there
is a need for a “fresh set of eyes”. A similar report on audit committees by Deloitte

58

and Touche (2010) states that audit committees must periodically evaluate its
members’ expertise and knowledge.
Directors & Boards (2008) invite a panel of experts who mention interesting
points such as how long does it take for directors to become complacent and if term
limits are a necessity or do they backfire and cause inefficiencies in the performance
of the board. The proponents for long tenure state that an experienced director has
better knowledge of the company and thus contributes to improved monitoring. On the
other hand, those against long tenure state that audit committee members who have
been on the board for too long are no longer independent of management.
Heidrick and Struggles (2006) conduct a study national survey of corporate
directors to evaluate what makes board of directors effective and how their current
practices continue to evolve in response to the environment. They find that 22 percent
of their respondents have imposed term-limits for their directors. Although term-limits
are not a common phenomenon, the number of boards imposing such limits has more
than doubled from 9 percent in 2000. It also emphasizes that companies need to strike
a balance between experienced members and new members to maintain the
effectiveness of the audit committee. The report supports change in the composition of
audit committee members but also states that too much turnover can cause
inefficiencies.
Lapides et al. (2007) list 21st Century Governance Principles for U.S. Public
Companies and recommend that the board should consider rotation of audit committee
members and impose term-limits which will limit the number of years a member can
serve on the audit committee. The NACD in its 1996 Report on Director
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Professionalism pioneered in the field of term-limits for board directors. Recently,
H&R Block announced in a press release dated June 17, 2008 that the company had
decided to impose a term-limit of limit of 12 years for members of the board of
directors. The company’s initiative indicates that it is important to have a “periodic
infusion of fresh thinking” by adding new board members and an adequate level of
turnover among board members promotes the effectiveness of the board. (Drysdale
and Rauber 2008) Audit committee related reports issued by KPMG (2009) and
Deloitte (2010) note the need for audit committees to have “fresh set of eyes.”
In the context of audit committees, the departure of a director with long tenure
may be viewed less negatively if investors believe the departure is part of the normal
rotation and bringing in “fresh set of eyes.” Conversely, the departure of a director
who has been on the audit committee for only a short period of time may raise more
concerns.
For example, two directors submitted their resignations from St Joe Co. merely
six weeks after they joined. Such news led to a decline in the stock price of 2.4%. The
board members said that they were resigning because they did not agree with
management on several issues. (WSJ, Feb 15, 2011). In another instance, there was an
announcement of the exit of Dynegy’s chief executive and chief financial officers who
submitted their resignation on February 21, 2011. In addition, five of the six board
members also announced that they will be resigning in June at the company’s annual
meeting. The top officers and board members cited that the lack of shareholder
approval for a potential buyout had caused frustration among directors and
management. (WSJ, February 22, 2011).
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The above discussion leads to my next hypothesis, focusing on the association
between audit committee director tenure and departure. My hypothesis is:

H05:

The market reaction to the departure of an audit committee director is more
negative if the director is a short-tenured director.

Some have argued that serving on too many boards spread a director thin, and
thus reduces the quantity and/or quality of the oversight provided by the director
(NACD 1996; Council of Institutional Investors 1998; U.S. Senate 2002). The
National Association of Corporate Directors (1996) suggests that corporate directors
who have full-time jobs should prohibit themselves from serving on more than three or
four other boards. The counter argument is that the number of other board
memberships may be viewed as a signal of the market’s assessment about a director
(Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983).
During the Enron hearings (U.S. Senate 2002), the Senators posed the
following question to some witnesses:
“Some directors of the Enron Board have been criticized for their membership
on numerous boards, calling into question their ability to dedicate time and
focus to issues at Enron. Would you be in favor of limiting the number of
corporate boards an individual may serve simultaneously?” (U.S. Senate 2002)
If a busy director resigns, then the negative reaction may be tempered by the
fact that the person serves on many boards; the counter-argument is that if multiple
board service is viewed as the market-based reward for an effective director, then the
resignation of such a director may elicit a more negative reaction.
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In my next hypothesis, I posit that market reaction to the exit of a ‘busy’
director will be negative because a ‘busy’ director is known to add value to the audit
committee because of the broad array of experiences he brings to the table.

H06:

The market reaction to the departure of a ‘busy’ director will be negative.

One measure used to calculate the strength of an audit committee is the number
of audit committee financial experts on the audit committee. In Chapter 2, I noted
comments from companies and others that there has been an acute shortage of
qualified directors who will agree to serve as audit committee financial experts due to
increased legal liability and reputational concerns. Therefore, when more than one
audit committee financial expert is present on the audit committee, it may be
perceived that the board of directors has taken measures to hire the most proficient
directors who serve as overseers of management on behalf of the shareholders. In such
cases, when the strength of the audit committee declines as a result of a departure, it is
likely that the market will react negatively because of the loss of an expert. Consistent
with this argument, DeFond et al. (2005) measure the strength of the audit committee
prior to a new appointment and find that the market reacts favorably when a financial
expert is added to an already existent strong corporate governance structure.
Conversely, if more than one expert is present on the audit committee, then the
departure may not elicit a negative market reaction. This is particularly the case in the
post-SOX period.
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My next hypothesis examines the association between the market reaction to
the departure of an audit committee directors and the presence of other experts on the
audit committee.

H07:

The market reaction to the departure of an audit committee director will be
more negative when there are zero experts on the committee post-departure.

SAMPLE AND DATA
I begin with a list of audit committee director departures that were disclosed in
Form 8-K filings with the SEC firms between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008
per the Audit Analytics database. As shown in Table 8, from this initial list of 1,059
audit committee director departures, I delete 16 duplicate observations where the same
director departure was reported twice. I also delete 76 audit committee departures
from foreign firms yielding a sample of 967 audit committee director departures for
746 firms.
When two or more directors exit on the same day, I code it as a single event.
As seen in Table 9, the 967 audit committee director departures encompass 881 unique
events. In 818 of the 881 instances, only one audit committee director departed. In 46
events, two directors departed simultaneously; there were another 17 instances with
simultaneous departures of three or more audit committee directors. Thus, the
overwhelming majority of audit committee director turnover is characterized by the
departure of one director at a time.
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Davidson et al. (2004) and DeFond et al. (2005) exclude from their primary
analyses audit committee director appointments that were concurrent with the
departure of a director. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) suggest that replacement
announcements are noisier than board expansion announcements. They note that such
(replacement) appointments with concurrent departures must be treated differently
from appointments without a concurrent departure. Following the same logic, I
partition my sample of audit committee director departures based on whether or not
there was a concurrent appointment of another audit committee director. I define
‘concurrent’ as appointment of an audit committee director within 5 days of the
departure of a director.

Table 9 shows that 73 percent of the 818 single director exit events occurred
without a concurrent appointment. With two exceptions, there was a concurrent
appointment of another single director in the remaining single director exit events. In
contrast to the above, a majority of the events with two audit committee directors
exiting have concurrent appointment of at least one audit committee director. Also,
eight of the 17 events with three or more audit committee director exit events include
the concurrent appointment of at least one new audit committee director.
I use the 8-K filing date as my event date. I obtain the 3-day (-1 to + 1) and 5day (-2 to +2) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) with value-weighted market
adjustment from Eventus. The estimation period ends on day -46 relative to the
announcement date; the minimum and maximum estimation periods are 3 and 255
days, respectively. I am able to obtain CAR data for 280 of the 818 single director
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exits. Of these 280 events, 67 had other contemporaneous news events (earnings
release, proxy statement release, other press releases or news announcements) in the
five days surrounding the director departure disclosure date. In another 80 instances,
there was a concurrent appointment of another audit committee director. After deleting
such observations, my final sample for market reaction analyses includes 133 single
director exit events.
In Table 12, I provide descriptive data about the market-reaction sample. The
mean (median) total assets of the sample firms is $1,344 ($478) million, indicating
that the sample is skewed. Similarly, the average annual revenues (market value) for
the sample firms is $846 ($891) million, while the median value is $231 ($358)
million. While I do not show descriptive statistics for the 16 multiple director events
with available data, T-tests indicate that the multiple directors exit group is
significantly (p < .01) smaller than the single director exit group in terms of total
assets and revenues.

RESULTS
In Table 13, I partition the single director exit sample by expert status. Of the
133 single director departures with no concurrent appointments, 48 are for those
classified as “audit committee financial experts.” I read through the biographies of the
departing directors, and classified 20 of them as “Accounting experts” (i.e., those with
experience as an auditor, or as a Chief Financial Officer, Chief Accounting Officer, or
other senior executive positions in accounting or finance, such as Vice-President—
Finance). The remaining 28 are classified as other financial experts; these members
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are designated audit committee financial experts but do not have a background in
auditing/accounting.
Audit committee directors who possess accounting and financial expertise are
valued members of the audit committee. These members are diligent and well versed
with finance and accounting nuances and their contribution helps the audit
committees. Therefore, in H04, I posit that the departure of such a director is deemed
negative by the market. As seen in Table 13, there are 20 director departure events
where the departing director is an accounting expert. There is a significant (p < .05)
negative market reaction to such events, with average 3-day and 5-day CAR values of
-3.1% and -4.0%. In contrast, the average 3-day CAR for the departure of the 28 nonaccounting financial experts is -1.3%; this is marginally significant in a T-test (p <
.10), but the median value of -0.6% is not significant in a non-parametric test; the 5day CAR is not significant in either parametric or non-parametric tests. Finally, the
mean market reaction to the departure of the 85 non-experts is not significant when
considering the 3-day or 5-day CAR, using either parametric or non-parametric tests.
Overall, the results indicate that only the departure of accounting experts elicits
a significant adverse reaction from the market. These results are consistent with the
findings of Davidson et al. (2004) and DeFond et al. (2005) related to the appointment
of different types of audit committee directors, as also the results from other recent
studies that show differences in various financial reporting measures based on
differences in the types of audit committee experts (Yang and Krishnan 2005;
Krishnan and Viswanathan 2008; Krishnan and Lee 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2010).

66

Departures partitioned by director tenure
In panel A of Table 14, I partition the departure of non-expert directors based
on the tenure on the audit committee of the departing director. I categorize tenure as
short (0-3 years), medium (4-6 years) and long (7 years or more). Overall, the market
reaction is not significantly different from zero in any cell, when I consider the sample
of non-expert directors.
Panel B of Table 14 examines the market reaction to the departure of expert
directors, when partitioned by the tenure of the director. In this group, the 3-day and 5day CARs for the departure of the director is significantly negative for both short and
medium-tenured directors; however, the reaction is not significant for the departure of
long-tenured directors. The evidence suggests that the market may view the departure
of an expert director less negatively if that director had a long tenure. This evidence is
consistent with calls to ensure that audit committee directors do not serve for too long
a period.
As part of my sensitivity analysis, I tried using the following cutoff points to
split the sample into two groups in each instance: five years or more, seven years or
more, and ten years or more. In each such partition, I obtain results that are
substantively similar to those reported in the paper—namely, the departure of expert
directors with shorter tenures elicits a negative market reaction, but the departure of
expert directors with long tenure does not elicit a negative market reaction.

67

Busy Director Exits
Panel A of Table 15 partitions the sample by whether the exiting director
serves on at least one other public company board; there are 36 directors who serve on
at least one other board at the time of their departure, while the remaining 49 have no
other board service. The data show that neither group of director exits elicits a
significant market reaction.
Panel B of Table 15 provides the market reactions for the departures of expert
directors, partitioned by the number of other public company board directorships.
There are 30 directors with no other board memberships, while 18 directors have one
more other board memberships. For both groups of departing directors, there is a
significant negative market reaction.
As part of my sensitivity analysis, I used two or more other board
memberships to define a busy board member. With this cutoff, there are 11 busy
directors each in the expert and non-expert groups. In the non-expert group, as before,
there is no significant market reaction to the departure of busy or non-busy directors.
In the case of expert directors, for the 37 events where the departing expert had one or
no other board memberships, both the 3-day and 5-day CARs are significantly
negative; for the 11 events where the departing director had two or more other board
memberships, the 3-day CAR is marginally negative.
Overall, the results suggest that—unlike the case with director tenure—there
are no significant differences in the market reaction based on whether or not the
departing audit committee director serves on other boards. While some good
governance advocates have called for restricting the number of board memberships,
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usually such calls seek to restrict the number of other board memberships at three or
more. I am unable to perform meaningful statistical analysis with a cutoff of three
because only five directors from the sample of 133 departing audit committee
directors served on four or more other boards.

Audit Committee Strength: Post Departure
As seen in Table 18, there is significant reaction to 33 events where there are
zero experts remaining on the audit committee post departure. The results are negative
and significant in both the 3-day window and the 5-day window. The results obtained
from my study support my hypothesis. When the number of experts remaining is zero,
I find that the 3-day CAR is -2.2% and the 5-day CAR is -2.5%. As the number of
experts remaining on the audit committee increases from zero to two, I note a positive
market reaction. These results show that the departure of an expert, especially when
there are no other experts remaining on the audit committee is perceived negatively by
the market and could be potential bad news for the future.

Regression Analysis
The evidence presented above pertained to analyses conducted in a univariate
setting. I now provide results of multivariate tests performed using ordinary least
square regression.
I perform four different multiple regressions, using the (a) 3-day or 5-day
market reaction as the dependent variable, separately for (b) expert and non-expert
director departures (thus, the 2 x 2 = 4 regressions). In each regression, the
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explanatory variables are (a) long tenure or not, and (b) whether or not the departing
director had membership in other public company boards. As seen in Table 16, in the
expert director departure regressions the Tenure variable is significant indicating that
the market reacts negatively to the departure of an expert who has served for less than
seven years; but the OtherBoard variable is not significant. However, neither of the
two regressions examining the departure of non-expert directors is significant.

Departures with Specific Reasons Given
In some instances, the departing directors provide specific reasons for their
departure. My sample of single director exits without a concurrent appointment
includes five instances where the directors note that they are leaving due to
disagreement with management. The mean (median) 5-day CAR is -7.5% (-4.5%) for
such departures; the 5-day CAR is significant (p < .05 for mean, p < .10 for median).
There are 14 instances where the departing director specifies too many commitments
as the reason; the market reaction to the departure of directors that list too many
commitments as the reason is not statistically significant.

SUMMARY
In this part of my dissertation, I examine market reaction to audit committee
director departures. I find that Audit committee directors who possess accounting and
financial expertise are valued members of the audit committee. My results show that
when the departing director is an accounting expert, there is a significant (p < .05)
negative market reaction to such events, with average 3-day and 5-day CAR values of
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-3.1% and -4.0%. In contrast, the average 3-day CAR for the departure of the 28 other
financial experts is -1.3%; this is marginally significant in a T-test (p < .10), but the
median value of -0.6% is not significant in a non-parametric test. Overall, the results
indicate that only the departure of accounting experts elicits a significant adverse
reaction from the market. These results are consistent with the findings of Davidson et
al. (2004) and DeFond et al. (2005) related to the appointment of different types of
audit committee directors, as also the results from other recent studies that show
differences in various financial reporting measures based on differences in the types of
audit committee experts (Yang and Krishnan 2005; Krishnan and Viswanathan 2008;
Krishnan and Lee 2009; Dhaliwal et al. 2010).
I also examine market reaction to audit committee director departure
partitioned by tenure. In this group, the 3-day and 5-day CARs for the departure of the
director is significantly negative for both short and medium-tenured directors;
however, the reaction is not significant for the departure of long-tenured directors. The
evidence suggests that the market may view the departure of an expert director less
negatively if that director had a long tenure. This evidence is consistent with calls to
ensure that audit committee directors do not serve for too long a period.
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V: AUDIT COMMITTEE COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONING
POST-ENRON
The first decade of the 21st century has witnessed some dramatic events that
have significantly altered the landscape of corporate governance. The Enron and
WorldCom failures, along with the failure of the Big 5 audit firm of Arthur Andersen,
led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) which brought sweeping
reforms in the corporate governance structure of U.S. publicly-held companies. SOX
is deemed to be one of the most significant legislative actions related to the regulation
of public companies since the Securities and Exchange acts of 1933 and 1934. SOX
(2002) tightened the rules for audit committees of public companies and strengthened
their roles.
As discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3, one of the important changes
brought forth by SOX was to require companies to disclose in their proxy statements if
the audit committee had an audit committee financial expert. The definition of “audit
committee financial expert” was very controversial. The initial SEC rule proposal was
quite narrow, and following a storm of criticism the SEC changed the definition by
relaxing the requirements. As discussed in more detail below, many critics suggested
that it would be very difficult to obtain qualified audit committee directors,
particularly those willing to be characterized as an audit committee financial expert.
Given such arguments, I examine the evolving composition of audit committees
during the decade from 2000 to 2009. Specifically, I examine the number of directors
on audit committees as well as the proportion of audit committee directors who could
be characterized as an audit committee financial expert.
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In this chapter, I also focus on a second topic of interest to regulators and other
good governance advocates. Given the intense media focus on corporate governance
in general, and audit committees in particular, in the immediate aftermath of Enron
and WorldCom, it was natural that there would be significant changes in the
functioning of audit committees. However, would the changes persist once the “bright
lights” of the media and legislators dimmed with the passage of time? In other words,
were the changes that occurred post-Enron and WorldCom merely temporary blips, or
more permanent? I examine this issue by focusing on the frequency of audit
committee meetings.
Background and Hypotheses
Audit committees continue to be an important element of the corporate
governance structure. Since the board of directors delegates the overseeing of the
financial reporting process to audit committees, it must ensure that this duty is
delegated to the right set of individuals. Since the passage of SOX (2002), there has
been a lot of discussion with regard to composition and functioning of audit
committees. During the period surrounding the enactment and implementation of SOX
(2002), there was significant criticism from the business community that it will be
hard to recruit directors to serve as audit committee members because of the increase
in risk and liability (Kirk 2000, Olson 1999).
The SEC’s proposed definition of the term “financial expert” was as follows:
“We proposed to define the term "financial expert" to mean a person who has,
through education and experience as a public accountant, auditor, principal
financial officer, controller or principal accounting officer, of a company that,
at the time the person held such position, was required to file reports pursuant
to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, or experience in one or more
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positions that involve the performance of similar functions (or that results, in
the judgment of the company's board of directors, in the person's having
similar expertise and experience),the following attributes:
(1)An understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and
financial statements;
(2) Experience applying such generally accepted accounting principles
in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals, and reserves
that are generally comparable to the estimates, accruals and reserves, if
any, used in the registrant's financial statements;
(3) Experience preparing or auditing financial statements that present
accounting issues that are generally comparable to those raised by the
registrant's financial statements;
(4) Experience with internal controls and procedures for financial
reporting; and
(5) An understanding of audit committee functions.” SEC (2003b)
This definition elicited much criticism. For example, the Vice President and
Controller of Aetna Inc. expressed his concerns stating that it is too “restrictive” and
may result in some unfavorable consequences for public companies. He noted that the
availability of qualified directors will be very difficult in specialized industries such as
insurance, stating “We support disclosure of whether a financial expert serves on a
company's audit committee. However, we are concerned that identifying, by name, the
person that the board of directors has determined to be the financial expert serving on
the company's audit committee may cause qualifying candidates to decline to serve,
due to the actual or perceived additional risk of personal liability” (Aetna 2002).
The American Association of Bank Directors (AABD 2002) urged the SEC to
expand the definition of a financial expert and noted that for many bank holding
companies that are listed on NASDAQ, it is a burdensome task to persuade a
qualifying person to serve as an audit committee financial expert because the task can
be “overwhelming, if not impossible”. The letter also noted that persons who are
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qualified to serve in such capacities may not agree to do so because of increase in
liability.
Similarly, another letter was sent to the SEC by Maine Bankers Association
expressing similar concerns such as, lack of such experts within geographical limits
and higher costs to recruit out of state directors. The President of Maine Bankers
Association (2002) stated that “A strict reading of the proposed definition would make
it extremely unlikely that a financial expert, willing to serve on the Audit Committees
of our registrant members, could be identified within the Companies' service areas, or
in the entire State of Maine. The most likely candidates meeting the definition would
be expensive, professional Board members from other regions of the United States.”
The General Counsel of AmSouth Bancorporation urged the SEC to expand
the definition of a financial expert because it will be difficult to find qualified
candidates to fit the proposed definition of a financial expert. He noted that “limiting
candidates to those persons with experience in the same or similar industry would
work a substantial hardship on many companies as they attempt to select persons who
satisfy the ‘financial expert’ definition.” (AmSouth Bancorporation 2002). He further
expressed the concern that the proposed definition “unnecessarily limits the universe
of persons who might be effective members of an audit committee and who should
qualify as financial experts. We are also concerned about the negative perceptions of
investors resulting from disclosures that only one, or for many companies, none, of the
directors on the audit committee can be deemed a financial expert under the
Commission's definition.”
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In summary, there were several critics that vehemently opposed the proposed
definition of a financial expert. A common theme of such criticism was that it would
be very difficult to obtain qualified audit committee directors, particularly “audit
committee financial experts.” This leads to the following hypothesis (stated in the null
form):

H08: The number and proportion of audit committee financial experts did not
change between 2000 and 2009.

Another issue related to audit committees that has attracted significant
attention in recent years is diligence. It is not enough for an audit committee to exist;
to be effective, it must be diligent. Prior researchers have focused on the frequency of
audit committee meetings as a measure of diligence. This is perhaps because the
number of meetings is the only publicly available data about the functioning of audit
committees.
Menon and Williams (1994) examine factors associated with frequency of
audit committee meetings. One interpretation of audit committee meetings is that
those that do not meet or meet only once are unlikely to be effective monitors of
management. On the other hand, a higher frequency of audit committee meetings is a
sign of the audit committee’s diligence in effective monitoring of the financial
reporting process. Their sample consists of 200 randomly selected over-the-counter
firms that that have active audit committees for the period 1986-1987. The authors
find that board composition has an impact on the frequency of audit committee
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meetings; as the proportion of outside directors on the board increases, the frequency
of audit committee meetings increases. In addition, the results indicate that larger
firms have more active audit committees.
Collier and Gregory (1999) use a sample of major UK companies listed on the
London Stock Exchange. Their sample is gathered from the results of a survey by
Collier (1992) who examined companies in the top 250 of the Times 1000 for 19891990. Their final sample consists of 167 companies of which 142 were usable replies.
They find that audit committee diligence (measured by audit committee activity) is
positively associated with a high quality external auditor (Big Six). They also find that
the CEO-Chair duality reduces audit committee meeting frequency. Collier and
Gregory (1999) also show that when the audit committee includes insiders such as
executive directors, the frequency of audit committee meetings is lower.
Lapides et al. (2007) recommend that audit committee members must meet
more frequently for extended period of time and should have unrestricted access to
information. Specifically, they recommend that face-to-face meetings should occur
quarterly and each meeting should hold an executive session. They also recommend
that the committee should meet in separate sessions of management, the external
auditor, the internal auditor, legal counsel and other advisors.
Sharma et al. (2009) study the determinants of audit committee meeting
frequency in New Zealand which has voluntary requirements for audit committee
formation, composition and responsibilities. Their sample comprises of 96 firms that
were listed on the main board of the NZX in fiscal 2004 and 2005. Their results show
that high-growth firms had fewer audit committee meetings, and firms with high
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managerial and institutional ownerships have more frequent audit committee
meetings.
Raghunandan and Rama (2007) examine 319 firms with a December 31 fiscal
year end in the S&P 600 index. They concentrate on small firms because large firms
most likely have other governance mechanism in place such as a larger analyst
following. They find that the number of audit committee meetings increases with the
higher proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee.
Raghunandan and Rama (2007) also state that “It is an empirical question
whether the frequency of audit committee meetings will increase, remain unchanged,
or decrease as we move further away from the spotlight on audit committees in the
immediate aftermath of Enron, WorldCom, and other failures that culminated in the
enactment of SOX”. I seek to answer this question, and examine the changes in the
frequency of audit committee meetings from 2000 to 2009. This leads to the following
hypothesis (stated in the null form):

H09: The number of audit committee meetings per year did not change between
2000 and 2009.

SAMPLE AND DATA
I begin with a sample of S&P 500 firms as of December 31, 1999. I delete
firms that are not present in years 2000-2002 and 2008-2009. My final sample
comprises of 288 S&P firms that have publicly accessible proxy information for years
2000-2002 and 2008-2009. For each of these 288 firms, I collect audit committee
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member names, age, and tenure. I also collect the number of audit committee meetings
each firm has in each of these years. I am able to collect changes in audit committee
member composition by comparing audit reports of 2001 with 2000; 2002 with 2001
and 2009 with 2008. This provides me names of ‘incoming’ audit committee directors
and ‘outgoing’ committee directors. By reading each proxy statement, I am able to
collect biographical information for each incoming and outgoing director and identify
their expertise as Audit/CPA, Accounting/Finance or Other.

RESULTS
Table 21 provides empirical evidence about the size of audit committees in
various years. The data show that the average size of audit committees increases from
4.27 in FY 2000 to 4.41 in 2001, and has a slight decrease to 4.38 in 2002. The
average audit committee size is 4.47 (4.55) in fiscal year 2008 (2009). The
proportions in Table 21 also show that fewer companies have three or fewer audit
committee members in 2009 than in 2000; in fact, there appears to be a steady decline
in the percent of audit committees with three or fewer audit committee members
during the period from 2000 to 2009. In addition, in the year 2000 there are 187 firms
that have four or less than four directors on their audit committees. However, this
number drops down steadily and only 153 firms have four or fewer directors in year
2009.
I also compare the number of audit committee members between 2000 and
2009. Because the sample firms are the same for both years, I use a paired-sample Ttest and found that T= -3.19 (0.0016). The results indicate that the mean size of audit
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committees differs significantly between 2000 and 2009. These results suggest that
audit committees have increased in size over the years. This evidence is at variance
with suggestions from many critics that it would become harder to find directors
willing to serve on audit committees.
Table 22 provides descriptive evidence about changes in audit committee
composition across the years examined. One notable feature is that a much higher
proportion of firms experienced no changes in audit committee composition in 200809, compared to the turbulent period of 2001-02; it also is interesting to note that the
number of firms with no changes in 2008-09 is significantly more than the number of
such firms in 2000-01.
In Table 23, I provide an overview of incoming audit committee directors who
possess audit and accounting expertise. My data examines changes in audit committee
composition for the years 2000-2002 and 2008-2009. Since there was no SEC rule
regarding experts on audit committees in years 2000-2002, I use my own definition to
describe an Audit/CPA expert, Accounting/Finance expert and Other expert.
The data show that the proportion of Audit/CPA and Accounting/Finance type
of experts account for 20.5 percent of incoming experts in 2001, and 25.5 percent in
2002; by contrast, these two types of experts account for 41.3 percent of the incoming
experts in 2008-09. A chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference
across the years (Chi-sq = 22.1, d.f. = 4, p <.001). These results are again contrary to
the concerns voiced by the critics at the time SOX was being debated in Congress, and
later when the SEC was implementing the rules pursuant to SOX.
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In Table 24, I partition my sample based on strength of audit committee prior
to the appointment of a new director. Similar to Defond et al. (2005), I combine
Audit/CPA and Accounting/Finance categories into one single group. In the year
preceding SOX (2002), there was no requirement for presence of a financial expert on
the audit committee; therefore there were no designated ‘audit committee financial
experts’ in the years 2000-2002. Hence, I use my own judgment and rely on prior
literature to define the category of accounting experts. I conduct univariate analysis
and find that an audit committee that lacked experts (zero experts on the audit
committee before appointment) was more likely to appoint directors without
accounting expertise.
In the years 2008-2009, six years after the advent of SOX (2002), not
surprisingly, I have just one audit committee that has zero experts on its audit
committee prior to a new appointment. This is in striking contrast with the number of
firms that had no such experts in 2001 or 2002. Interestingly, audit committee
accounting experts appear to be more likely to be appointed in firms already have
more than two such experts on the committee.
In Table 23, I divide the incoming and outgoing audit committee financial
experts into the following three categories: Audit/CPA, Accounting/Finance and Other.
I find that there is a significant increase in the number of Accounting/Finance experts.
Approximately 34 percent of the incoming directors in fiscal year 2009 are
Accounting/Finance experts compared to Audit/CPA experts who constituted only 7
percent of the incoming members. The interesting part here is that even many of those
not formally classified as an “audit committee financial expert” by the company have
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the qualifications which enable me to classify them as Audit/CPA or
Accounting/Finance experts. Why, then, do the firms resist so classifying such a
director as an “audit committee financial expert?” This is an interesting question for
future research.
Audit Committee Meetings
Table 26 provides empirical evidence about the number of audit committee
meetings for each of the years 2000-2002 and 2008-2009. The results show an
increase in the number of meetings from 2000 to 2001; however, since I do not know
the exact dates of the meetings, and since the Enron problems came to light in October
of 2001, I cannot rule out the possibility that some of the increase in audit committee
meetings occurred in late 2001.
The results show a dramatic increase in the number of audit committee
meetings in 2002. The mean number of audit committee meetings jumps from 5.09 in
2001 to 7.36 in 2002. The differences are indeed striking: only 17 of the 288 firms had
less than four meetings in 2002, compared to 58 firms in 2001 and 88 firms in 2000.
Both a T-test and a chi-square test reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the
frequency of meetings across the three years, 2000 to 2002. Such empirical evidence
supports claims made in both prior academic research and in the popular press that
audit committees have become more diligent in the aftermath of the Enron, WorldCom
and Andersen failures.
More interesting is to observe the number of audit committee meetings in 2008
and 2009. The results do not support the conjecture that once the bright lights of the
media faded with the passage of time, audit committees would revert back to how they
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were prior to SOX. In fact, the average number of meetings is more in 2008 than in
2002 (8.74 versus 7.36). A paired T-test rejects the null hypothesis of no difference in
favor of the alternative that the meetings are more frequent in 2008 (p < .05).
However, there is no significant difference in the number of audit committee meetings
between 2008 and 2009. Taken together, my data enable me to answer the question
posed in Raghunandan and Rama (2007), namely, whether the frequency of audit
committee meetings will increase, remain unchanged, or decrease as we move further
away from the spotlight on audit committees in the immediate aftermath of Enron,
WorldCom, and other failures that culminated in the enactment of SOX. The answer is
that the frequency of audit committee meetings appear to have increased significantly
as we move further away from the 2001-2002 period.

83

VI: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Audit committees have long been an important element in the corporate
governance framework. The SEC has long promoted the formation of independent
audit committees that would be diligent in providing oversight of the financial
reporting process. Starting from around 1998, the pace of regulatory, legislative and
private sector initiatives related to audit committees has quickened. Such activities
culminated in the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. Multiple sections of
SOX deal with the composition and functioning of audit committees. Yet, there has
been very little published research related to the appointment and departures of audit
committee directors.
In this dissertation, I examine three issues related to the composition of audit
committees. In the first part of my dissertation, I explore market reaction to audit
committee director appointments. Using a sample of 360 audit committee singledirector appointments during 2008, I find that the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns
surrounding the announcement of appointing an Audit/CPA to serve on the audit
committee is positive even though the director is not a designated audit committee
financial expert; however, when a designated audit committee financial expert is hired,
there is no significant market reaction. Thus, my results provide partial support to the
hypothesis that hiring an Audit/CPA expert to the committee is viewed positively by
the market. However, I do not find support to the hypotheses that the market reaction
will differ based on the number of experts already present on the audit committee or
the holding of other board memberships by the director.
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The second part of my dissertation investigates the market reaction to audit
committee director departures. My sample consists of 133 audit committee director
departure events during 2007 and 2008. I find the news about the departure of an
expert director from the audit committee elicits a significant negative market reaction.
Additional analysis reveals that the 3-day and 5-day CARs for the departure of the
director is significantly negative for the departure of short and medium-tenured
directors; however, the reaction is not significant for the departure of long-tenured
directors.
Taken together, the above results suggest the appointment and departures
expert directors to the audit committee are value relevant to the market. The findings
provide empirical support to legislative and regulatory actions related to audit
committee financial experts. In this context, it is interesting to note that while SOX
mandates that all audit committee directors must be independent it only requires
disclosure if the audit committee has at least one expert. The evidence also suggests
that the market may view the departure of an expert director less negatively if that
director had a long tenure; this finding is consistent with calls from governance
experts to ensure that audit committee directors do not serve for too long a period.
In the aftermath of Enron, as Congress was debating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
there were many critics who expressed fears that the requirements of SOX would
make it difficult to hire of individuals with the necessary expertise to serve as audit
committee members. There is little empirical evidence to support—or, refute—such
assertions. In the third part of my dissertation I analyze the change in audit
committees a decade after Enron and passage of SOX. I find that directors with
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Audit/CPA and Accounting/Finance experience are sought after and most firms
continue to add audit committee financial experts to their audit committees; in many
instances, such additions happen in companies that already have multiple audit
committee financial experts. Hence, the evidence does not appear to support the
claims of critics who submitted to the SEC that the SOX related requirements would
make it difficult to find audit committee financial experts willing to serve on audit
committees. In the third part of my dissertation, I also examine the frequency of audit
committee meetings in 2000-2002 and 2008-2009. While prior research has noted that
the frequency of audit committee meetings increased in the immediate aftermath of
SOX, researchers and others have questioned if audit committee behavior would revert
back once the “bright lights” associated with the Enron and Andersen failures
dimmed. However, I find that the number of audit committee meetings has continued
to increase, contrary to concerns that audit committees would become less diligent
with the passage of time.
As with empirical research in general, my study is subject to some limitations.
First, I only examine audit committee appointments during 2008 and audit committee
departures during 2007 and 2008. This period coincides with the global economic
downturn precipitated by the financial market crises, and it is not clear if the same
findings would be obtained in other (less turbulent) periods. Second, my sample is
restricted to US firms. It is not clear if similar results would be obtained in other
countries, given significant differences in governance mechanisms. These limitations
also represent avenues for further research.
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Table 1
Audit Committee Director Appointments: Sample Selection
Initial Sample
Audit Committee Director Appointments during 2008 per Audit Analytics: 1351
Less: Duplicate observations (same appointment reported twice)
3
1348
Less: Foreign firms
114
1234
Less: Multiple appointments
348
886
Less: Departures that were concurrent
115
771
Less: Missing permno and ticker
231
540
Less: Companies with other contemporaneous news
180
Total Number of Events

360
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Table 2
Audit Committee Director Appointments (n=360)
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

S.D.

25th
percentile

Median

75th
percentile

Total Assets

10576.13

37282.49

142.63

884.75

3949.46

Revenues

4515.34

13469.54

80.06

392.37

3025.76

Market
Value

4191.43

13482.05

71.48

318.24

1524.52

Note: All numbers presented above are in millions.

Panel B: Composition of Sample by Industry
Category
NonDurables
Durables
Manufacturing
Energy
High-Tech
Telecom
Shops
Healthcare
Utilities
Other
Total

Number of
Firms
17
7
34
21
80
11
23
45
18
104
360

Percentage of
Total
4.7%
1.9%
9.4%
5.8%
22.2%
3.1%
6.4%
12.5%
5.0%
28.9%
100.0%

Note: I use the ten industry groups, as defined by Dr. French; the classifications are
available at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
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Table 3
Market Reaction to Audit Committee Director Appointments
Panel A: Single Director Appointment
Number of
Events

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

360

-0.002
(0.000)
51%

-0.002
(0.000)
50%

Note: In each cell, the first (second) number represents the mean (median) value for
the value-weighted market-adjusted return, while the number in the last row
represents the percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted return. ** and
* = significant at
p < .05, and p < .10, respectively.
Panel B: By Expert Status
Type of Incoming
Director
Expert
(n=168)
Not Expert
(n=192)

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

-0.006
(0.000)
50%

-0.005
(-0.005)
52%

0.001
(-0.001)
51%

0.000
(0.002)
48%

Note: This table presents cumulative abnormal return to appointment of audit
committee financial experts and non-experts. Expert (Not Expert) refers to
appointments where the incoming director is (not) an audit committee financial
expert. In each cell, the first (second) number represents the mean (median)
value for the value-weighted market-adjusted return, while the number in the
last row represents the percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted
return. * Significant at p < .10.
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Table 4
Audit Committee Director Appointments (Year 2008)
Panel A: Types of Directors
Audit Committee Financial
Expert
(n=168)
Audit/
Accounting/
Other
CPA
Finance
113
(67.3%)

55
(32.7%)

0
(0.00%)

NOT Audit Committee
Financial Expert
(n=192)
Audit/
Accounti
Other
CPA
ng/
Finance
60
17
115
(31.3%)
(8.9%)
(59.9%)

Tota
l
360

Panel B: Market Reaction by Expert Status

Type of Director

Type of Expert

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

Audit/CPA
(n=113)

-0.005
(0.001)
48%

-0.011
(-0.009)
58%

Accounting/Finance
(n=55)

-0.008
(-0.001)
55%

0.007
(0.007)
42%

Audit/CPA
(n=60)

0.022*
(0.006)
48%

0.018
(0.009)
43%

Accounting/Finance
(n=17)

-0.034
(-0.015)
71%

-0.012
(0.005)
47%

Other
(n=115)

-0.005
(0.000)
50%

-0.008
(0.000)
50%

Audit Committee
Financial Experts
(n=168)

NOT Audit
Committee
Financial Experts
(n=192)

90

Table 5
Market Reaction to Appointment of Audit Committee Financial Expert
Partitioned by Number of Experts Post-Appointment

Number of Experts on
Audit Committee PostAppointment

Number of
events

-1 to +1
CAR

-2 to +2
CAR

0-1

201

-0.001
(-0.003)
52%

-0.005
(-0.002)
52%

2-3

129

-0.012**
(-0.002)
52%

-0.005
(0.000)
50%

4 or more

30

0.030***
(0.018)
37%

0.031*
(0.026)
37%

Note: This table presents cumulative abnormal return to appointment of audit
committee financial experts, when partitioned by the number of experts on
the audit committee (following the appointment of the new director). In each
cell, the first (second) number represents the mean (median) value for the
value-weighted market-adjusted return, while the number in the last row
represents the percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted return.
** Significant at p < .05.
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Table 6
Number of other Directorships of Appointed Director and Market Reaction
Number of other
boards served

Number of
directors
appointed

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

0

213

-0.005
(-0.005)
51%

-0.007
(-0.006)
49%

1 or more

147

0.002
(0.002)
50%

0.004
(0.004)
52%

Note: This table presents cumulative abnormal return to departures of audit
committee directors without a concurrent appointment, when partitioned by
the number of other boards served on by the departing director. In each
cell, the first (second) number represents the mean (median) value for the
value-weighted market-adjusted return, while the number in the last row
represents the percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted
return.
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Table 7
Market Reaction to New outside director appointment or appointment to Audit
Committee from the Board
Type of
appointment

From board
(n=31)

From outside
(n=329)

Type of Expertise
and number of
directors
appointed

-1 to +1
CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

Audit/CPA
(n=10)

-0.035
(0.017)
40%

-0.048
(0.000)
50%

Accounting/Finance
(n=11)

0.019
(0.003)
46%

0.035
(0.029)
27%

Other
(n=10)

0.007
(-0.005)
60%

-0.004
(0.011)
40%

Audit/CPA
(n=163)

0.007
(0.001)
49%

0.002
(-0.005)
53%

Accounting/Finance
(n=61)

-0.020*
(-0.007)
61%

-0.004
(0.005)
46%

Other
(n=105)

-0.007
(0.001)
49%

-0.008
(0.000)
51%

Note: This table presents cumulative abnormal return to appointments of
audit committee directors, when partitioned by a new appointment from
outside or an appointment from within the Board. In each cell, the first
(second) number represents the mean (median) value for the valueweighted market-adjusted return, while the number in the last row
represents the percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted
return.
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Table 8
Audit Committee Director Departures: Sample Selection
Initial Sample
Audit Committee Director Departures during 2007-2008 per Audit Analytics: 1059
Less: Duplicate observations (same departure reported twice)
16
1043
Less: Foreign firms
76
Total Director Departures

967

Total Number of Events
(Note: When multiple directors depart on the same day, I code it as a
single event)

881

Total Number of firms

746
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Table 9
Audit Committee Director Departures: With and Without Concurrent
Appointments
Departure of Single Director:
With No Concurrent Appointments
With One Concurrent Appointment
With Two or More Concurrent Appointments
Departure of Two Directors:
With No Concurrent Appointments
With One Concurrent Appointment
With Two or More Concurrent Appointments
Departure of Three or More Directors
With No Concurrent Appointments
With One Concurrent Appointment
With Two or More Concurrent Appointments
Total number of events

601
215
2
818
20
10
16
46
9
4
4
17
881
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Table 10
Audit Committee Director Departures
Sample for Market Reaction Analyses
Events
Events without
without
other
contemporaneous concurrent
news
appointment

Number of
audit
committee
directors
exiting

Initial
Sample of
audit
committee
director
departures

Events with
data to
calculate
cumulative
abnormal
returns

1

818

280

213

133

2

46

19

15

6

3 or more

17

1

1

0

Note: The table above presents the overall sample of audit committee director
departures. The first column shows the number of directors exiting; for example there
were 17 firms where three or more audit committee directors resigned on the same
date.
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Table 11
Market Reaction to Single Director Exit, No Concurrent Appointment
Descriptive Analysis
(n=133)
Mean

Standard
Deviation

25th
percentile

Median

75th
percentile

Total
Assets

1344.01

2304.40

88.09

478.23

1219.02

Revenues

845.79

1551.12

58.10

231.43

839.38

Market
Value

890.91

1383.43

84.27

357.86

898.95

Note: All amounts are in millions of dollars.
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Table 12
Market Reaction to Audit Committee Director Departures

Panel A: Single Director Exit
Type of Event

Number of
Events

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

Number with no concurrent
appointments

133

-0.007
(-0.004)
54%

-0.004
(-0.003)
50%

Number with 1 concurrent
appointment

80

-0.007
(-0.005)
59%

-0.015
(-0.009)
59%

Number of
Events

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

Number with no concurrent
appointments
(n=12)

6

-0.147
(-0.042)
67%

0.006
(0.019)
50%

Number with 1 or more
concurrent appointments
(n=21)2

10

0.067
(0.017)
44%

0.078**
(0.022)
25%

Panel B: Two or more Directors Exit
Type of Event
(n=number of directors
exiting)

Note: In each cell, the first (second) number represents the mean (median) value for
the value-weighted market-adjusted return, while the number in the last row
represents the percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted return. ** and
* = significant at p < .05, and p < .10, respectively.

2

I had 10 events where two audit committee directors quit on the same day and 1 event where
three directors quit on the same day.
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Table 13
Market Reaction to Audit Committee Director Departures: By Expert Status

Type of Outgoing
Director

Number of
events

Accounting Expert

20

Other Financial Expert

28

Non-Expert

85

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

-0.031**
(-0.022)**
75%
-0.013*
(-0.006)
57%
0.000
(0.004)
47%

-0.040**
(0.000)**
75%
-0.011
(0.000)
54%
0.008
(0.007)
44%

Note: This table presents cumulative abnormal return to departure of audit committee
financial experts and non-experts, when an audit committee director resigns without a
concurrent appointment of another director to the audit committee. “Accounting
Expert” refers to directors who are audit committee financial experts with experience
in the field of accounting and/or auditing; “Other Financial Expert” refers to directors
who are designated “audit committee financial experts” but do not have accounting
and/or auditing experience. Non-Expert refers to departing directors who are not
designated as experts.
In each cell, the first (second) number represents the mean (median) value for the
value-weighted market-adjusted return, while the number in the last row represents
the percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted return. ** Significant at
p < .05; * Significant at p < .10.
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Table 14
Departing Director Tenure and Market Reaction
Panel A: Non-Expert Director Departures
Tenure of
departing director

Number of
directors
exiting

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

0-3 years

24

-0.012
(-0.004)
55%

-0.004
(0.004)
48%

4-6 years

22

-0.005
(-0.004)
56%

-0.008
(-0.026)
64%

7 or more years

39

-0.005
(-0.004)
53%

-0.001
(0.007)
44%

Panel B: Expert Director Departures
Tenure of departing
director

Number of
directors
exiting

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

0-3 years

18

-0.035***
(-0.026)**
78%

-0.037*
(-0.017)**
72%

4-6 years

14

-0.022**
(-0.020)*
71%

-0.039***
(-0.036)***
86%

7 or more years

16

0.001
(0.001)
44%

0.002
(0.012)
31%

Note: This table presents cumulative abnormal return to departures of audit committee directors without a
concurrent appointment, when partitioned by the audit committee tenure of the departing director. In each cell,
the first (second) number represents the mean (median) value for the value-weighted market-adjusted return,
while the number in the last row represents the percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted return.
***, **, and * = Significant at p < .01, 05, and .10, respectively.
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Table 15
Number of other Directorships of Departing Director and Market Reaction
Panel A: Non-Expert Director Departures
Number of other
boards served

Number of
directors
exiting

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

0

49

0.000
(0.004)
47%

0.005
(0.007)
43%

1 or more

36

-0.001
(0.001)
50%

0.012
(0.007)
44%

Panel B: Expert Director Departures
Number of other
boards served

Number of
directors
exiting

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

0

30

-0.021**
(-0.016)*
63%

-0.023*
(-0.014)
60%

1 or more

18

-0.017**
(-0.017)
67%

-0.027**
(-0.020)
67%

Note: This table presents cumulative abnormal return to departures of audit
committee directors without a concurrent appointment, when partitioned by the
number of other boards served on by the departing director. In each cell, the first
(second) number represents the mean (median) value for the value-weighted
market-adjusted return, while the number in the last row represents the percent of
observations with a negative market-adjusted return. ** and * = Significant at p
< .05 and .10, respectively.
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Table 16
Regression Results
Departure of Expert Directors
(n=48)

Departure of Non-Expert
Directors
(n=85)

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

-1 to +1
CAR

-2 to +2
CAR

-0.0004
Intercept
(.97)
-0.0287
Tenure
(.07)
0.0059
OtherBoard
(.73)
F = 1.17
p =.19
Adj.R.sq.= .03

0.0057
(.74)
-0.0452
(.03)
0.0085
(.70)
F = 2.46
p =.09
Adj.R.sq.= .06

-0.0084
(.38)
-0.0087
(.46)
0.0189
(.26)
F = 0.92
p =.40
Adj.R.sq.=
.00

-0.0094
(.74)
0.0270
(.16)
0.0003
(.99)
F = 1.00
p =.37
Adj.R.sq.=
.00

Variable

Note: This table presents the results from four regressions, where the dependent
variable is the 3-day or 5-day cumulative abnormal market reaction surrounding
the announcement of the departure of an audit committee director. The variables
are defined as follows: Tenure = 1 if the departing director served on the audit
committee for less than seven years, else 0; OtherBoard = 1 if the departing
director served on at least one other public company board, else 0. The values in
the cells represent the regression coefficient (p-value).
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Table 17
Market Reaction to Audit Committee Director Departure: By Reasons Given
Single Director Exit

Reason

Concurrent
appointment

-1 to +1
CAR

-2 to +2
CAR

-0.030
(-0.045)
60%

-0.075*
(-0.045)
100%

0.060
(0.003)
50%

0.016
(-0.003)
57%

-0.011*
(-0.005)
53%

-0.003
(0.003)
47%

(n = Number of
directors exiting)

Disagreement
with
management

No Concurrent
appointments
(n=5)

Too many
commitments

No Concurrent
appointments
(n=14)

All other
reasons

No Concurrent
appointments
(n=114)
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Table 18
Market Reaction to Departure of Audit Committee Financial Expert: Partitioned
by Number of Experts Post-Departure
Number of Experts
Still on Audit
Committee PostDeparture

Number of
events

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

0

33

-0.022***
(-0.018)*
64%

-0.025**
(-0.012)
61%

1

79

-0.006
(0.000)
52%

0.002
(0.004)
48%

2 or more

21

0.011
(0.000)
48%

0.010
(0.008)
43%

Note: This table presents cumulative abnormal return to departure of audit
committee financial experts, when partitioned by the number of experts still
on the audit committee (following the resignation of the expert director). In
each cell, the first (second) number represents the mean (median) value for
the value-weighted market-adjusted return, while the number in the last row
represents the percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted return.
** Significant at p < .05.
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Table 19
Market Reaction by Age of Directors
Age

Number of
directors
exiting

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

<55 years

69

-0.006
(-0.005)
54%

-0.024*
(-0.012)
59%

55-64
years

60

0.005
(-0.006)
58%

0.006
(-0.013)
58%

65-69
years

44

0.001
(-0.002)
52%

0.017
(0.007)
41%

>=70 years

40

-0.003
(-0.002)
53%

-0.004
(0.002)
45%

Note: This table presents cumulative abnormal return to departure of audit
committee directors, when partitioned by the age of the departing director. In
each cell, the first (second) number represents the mean (median) value for
the value-weighted market-adjusted return, while the number in the last row
represents the percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted return.
** Significant at p < .05.
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Table 20
Market Reaction to Complete Exit from the Board or Position Change within the
company
Type of exit

From board
(n=105)

From audit
committee
only
(n=28)

Type and
number of
directors
exiting

-1 to +1 CAR

-2 to +2 CAR

Out Financial
expert
n=14

-0.031
(-0.020)
79%

-0.039
(-0.028)
71%

Out Non
Financial Expert
n=23

-0.012*
(-0.011)
57%

-0.021**
(-0.005)
57%

Out Non Expert
n=68

0.003
(0.004)
49%

0.015
(0.005)
46%

Out Financial
Expert
n=6

-0.031
(-0.021)
67%

-0.043**
(-0.034)
83%

Out Non
Financial Expert
n=5

-0.009
(-0.005)
60%

0.024
(0.017)
40%

Out Non Expert
n=17

-0.013
(0.004)
47%

-0.019
(0.011)
35%

Note: This table presents cumulative abnormal return to departures of audit
committee directors without a concurrent appointment, when partitioned by
complete exit from the firm or exit from audit committee only (i.e., continue
to be on the board, but not as audit committee member). In each cell, the first
(second) number represents the mean (median) value for the value-weighted
market-adjusted return, while the number in the last row represents the
percent of observations with a negative market-adjusted return.
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Number of
AC
Members
Only 2
Only 3
Only 4
Only 5
6 or more
Total
Number of
AC
Members
Average
Size of AC

Table 21
Audit Committee (AC): Size
(n=288)
2000
2001
2002
2008

2009

9
(3.1%)
89
(30.9%)
89
(30.9%)
50
(17.4%)
51
(17.7%)
1230

2
(0.7%)
80
(27.8%)
91
(31.6%)
65
(22.6%)
50
(17.4%)
1270

2
(0.7%)
76
(26.4%)
96
(33.3%)
67
(23.3%)
47
(16.3%)
1262

0
(0.0%)
60
(20.8%)
98
(34.0%)
84
(29.2%)
46
(16.0%)
1287

0
(0.00%)
51
(17.7%)
102
(35.4%)
85
(29.5%)
50
(17.4%)
1309

4.27

4.41

4.38

4.47

4.55

Note: The sample includes 288 S&P 500 firms with a December 31 fiscal
year end and with all available data for the fiscal years 2000-2002 and 20082009. Each cell indicates the number of firms with percentage in parentheses.
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Table 22
Changes in Audit Committee Composition
Year
20002001
20012002
20082009

0,0
-1,+1
119
44
(41.3%) (15.3%)
101
56
(35.1%) (19.4%)
160
29
(55.5%) (10.1%)

-2,+2
11
(3.8%)
15
(5.2%)
5
(1.7%)

-1,0
0,+1
29
42
(10.1%) (14.6%)
27
40
(9.4%) (13.9%)
28
33
(9.7%) (11.5%)

Other
43
(14.9%)
49
(17.0%)
33
(11.5%)

Total
288
288
288

Note: The sample includes 288 S&P 500 firms with a December 31 fiscal year end
and with all available data for the fiscal years 2000-2002 and 2008-2009. Each cell
indicates the number of firms for each type of change in audit committee
composition, where X, Y indicates that the number of outgoing and incoming
directors were X and Y respectively. Thus, for example, the -1, 1 cell for 20002001 indicates that between years 2000-2001, there were 44 cases where there was
one outgoing member and one incoming member. The number in parentheses is
the percentage of firms out of 288.
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Table 23
Changes in Audit Committee Composition by Type of Director
Panel A: Directors with Accounting and Finance Experience (Incoming)
Year

Audit/CPA

Accounting/Finance

Other

Total

2000-2001

8
(4.1%)

32
(16.4%)

155
(79.5%)

195

2001-2002

18
(8.7%)

37
(17.8%)

153
(73.5%)

208

2008-2009

10
(7.2%)

47
(34.1%)

81
(58.7%)

138

Panel B: Directors with Accounting and Finance Experience (Outgoing)
Year
Audit/CPA Accounting/Finance
Other
Total
2000-2001

3
(2.0%)

14
(9.0%)

138
(89.0%)

155

2001-2002

4
(1.8%)

38
(17.6%)

174
(80.6%)

216

2008-2009

8
(6.9%)

26
(22.4%)

82
(70.7%)

116

Note: In this table, I present the number of directors (incoming and outgoing) and
their expertise. The sample includes 288 S&P 500 firms with a December 31
fiscal year end and with all available data for the fiscal years 2000-2002 and
2008-2009.

110

Table 24
Strength of Audit Committee before Appointment of New Director

Year
20002001
n=138

Year
20012002
n=155

Year
20082009
n=98

Number of
Experts on Audit
Committee before
Appointment

Number of Firms
(Number of
Directors)

Number of
Directors with
Accounting
Expertise

Number of
Directors
without
Accounting
Expertise

0

77 (113)

23

90

1

37 (53)

12

41

2

19 (23)

5

18

3 or more

5 (6)

0

6

Number of
Experts on Audit
Committee before
Appointment

Number of Firms
(Number of
Directors)

Number of
Directors with
Accounting
Expertise

0

68 (96)

24

Number of
Directors
without
Accounting
Expertise
72

1

60 (79)

21

58

2

19 (23)

8

15

3 or more

8 (10)

2

8

Number of
Experts on Audit
Committee before
Appointment

Number of Firms
(Number of
Directors)

Number of Audit
Committee
Financial Experts

0

1 (1)

0

Number of
NOT Audit
Committee
Financial
Experts
1

1

31 (41)

11

30

2

32 (50)

28

22

3 or more

34 (46)

30

16

Note: The sample includes 288 S&P 500 firms with a December 31 fiscal year end and with all
available data for the fiscal years 2000-2002 and 2008-2009.
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Table 25
Changes in Audit Committee Financial Experts (Year 2008-2009)

Incoming Directors
(n=138)

Outgoing Directors
(n=116)

Audit Committee Financial
Expert
(n=69)
Audit/
CPA
7
(10.1%)

Accounting/
Finance
35
(50.8%)

Other
27
(39.1%)

NOT Audit Committee Financial
Expert
(n=69)
Audit/
CPA
3
(4.3%)

Accounting
/Finance
12
(17.4%)

Other
54
(78.3%)

Audit Committee Financial Expert
(n=57)

NOT Audit Committee Financial
Expert
(n=59)

Audit/
CPA
7
(12.3%)

Audit/
CPA
1
(1.7%)

Accounting/
Finance
17
(29.8%)

Other
33
(57.9%)

Accounting
/Finance
9
(15.3%)

Other
49
(83.0%)

Note: The sample includes 288 S&P 500 firms with a December 31 fiscal year end,
and with all available data for the fiscal years 2000-2002 and 2008- 2009.The above
table reflects the number (and type) of incoming and outgoing audit committee
directors.
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Table 26
Audit Committee: Number of Meetings
(n=288)
Number of
AC
Meetings
<4
4-8
9-12
12 or more

2000

2001

2002

2008

2009

88
(30.6%)
187
(64.9%)
13
(4.5%)
0
(0.0%)
4.50

58
(20.1%)
213
(74.0%)
14
(4.9%)
3
(1.0%)
5.09

17
(5.9%)
187
(64.9%)
73
(25.4%)
11
(3.8%)
7.36

1
(0.3%)
140
(48.6%)
123
(42.7%)
24
(8.4%)
8.74

0
(0.00%)
145
(50.3%)
119
(41.3%)
24
(8.4%)
8.64

Average
number of
meetings
Note: The sample includes 288 S&P 500 firms with a December 31 fiscal year end,
and with all available data for the fiscal years 2000-2002 and 2008-2009. Each cell
indicates the number (percentage) of firms with the specified number of audit
committee meetings during that year.
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